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GLADSTONIAN LIBERALISM: A CATALYST FOR
SOCIAL REPRESENTATION AND DEMOCRATIC
REFORM IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN

An Abstract of the Thesis by
Jason Samuel Belcher

William Gladstone and his political administration demonstrated a unique
approach to social representation in nineteenth-century Britain. Most of the research for
this thesis focuses on historians who examined both the variable nature of the term
democracy in Victorian Britain as well as depict Gladstone’s bureaucratic achievements
as an MP. A large portion of the thesis employs information extracted from contemporary
nineteenth-century British newspapers in order to provide firsthand perspectives of
Britain’s political administration during the Gladstone years of service. Many modern
sources of information provide varying outlooks on Gladstonian Liberalism. These
sources contribute to a viewpoint of Gladstonian Liberalism as a gradually progressive
form of societal management implemented within a consistently transitioning imperial
system. Although the general consensus of both contemporary and secondary historic
accounts does not typically portray Gladstone as a revolutionary for democratic change,
Gladstone’s endeavors in Liberal reform included elements of democratic changes that
encouraged Parliamentary policy to be more supportive of typically underrepresented
social groups. With these policies, Gladstonian Liberalism introduced, during the
Victorian Era, a force through which democratic representation began to emerge in the
British Empire prior to the reforms of twentieth-century democracy.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis highlights the significance of Gladstonian Liberalism as a
representative medium tailored toward democratic progression for British society in the
nineteenth century. The fact that William Gladstone introduced aspects of democratic
representation into Britain’s governance during the Victorian Era makes Gladstone’s
policies a prelude to twentieth-century democracy and decolonization. When studying the
British political system of the Victorian era, the principles of representation of the
Britain’s citizens bore various meanings for Members of Parliament (MPs) whose
methods of governance often employed a combination of well-intentioned administration
and practical compromise. William Gladstone is certainly no exception to these facets of
parliamentary operation; however, his energetic pursuit of social reforms and his
malleable approach regarding representative measures sets him apart from his
contemporaries in regard to his influence on the politics of his day. Gladstone made a
concerted effort to give the common man a voice in governmental decisions.
For the purpose of this thesis, Gladstonian Liberalism will be defined as the
methods and policies used by Gladstone during a career that incorporated a hybrid of
conservative and liberal stances in order to effect positive change for subjects of the
British Empire. As Gladstone’s political affiliations evolved from a young conservative
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Peelite to an established liberal prime minister, his official position on political issues
was not strictly liberal nor fully conservative. Therefore, the thesis will identify the bulk
of these policies as Gladstonian Liberalism. Gladstone’s ability to garner support from
his respective party and recognition from minority factions in Parliament allowed him to
promote policies incorporating specific democratic values that, while not completely new
in theory, proved workable under his administrative duties. To clarify, Gladstone did not
embrace direct democracy, nor did he desire that the power of governance fall entirely
upon the British people. Rather, Gladstone favored a gradually progressive form of
democracy made feasible because of his leadership capabilities and his attention to the
plight of underrepresented people.
Despite occasionally risking detriment to his own political career or at the very
least in contrast to his own ambitions, Gladstone confronted a number of British
concerns, both at home and abroad, such as addressing the notion of
disestablishmentarianism in Ireland, of reforming budget policies in favor of the British
people, of extending enfranchisement to the working class in Britain, of contributing a
political voice for nations formerly exclusive to imperial concerns, and of embracing the
controversial matter of Irish Home Rule. Each of these issues emerged with a mark of
Gladstonian zeal, and Gladstone accomplished what other MPs previously failed to do
regarding the transition of Britain into a modern United Kingdom capable of representing
numerous communities through a persuasive and adaptive policy. In fairness, Gladstone
did not single-handedly revolutionize the practices of the British Empire. However,
through his governance British MPs adopted progressive protocols formerly unobtainable
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in Parliament and sealed Gladstone as a significant paragon for democratic reform via
adaptive representation in the nineteenth century.
Interestingly, Gladstone’s politics, policies, and approach change over time.
Beginning as an early conservative Anglican, Gladstone evolved into an effective liberalleaning politician. He did not compromise his personal principles except where pragmatic
decision-making tended to aid democratization or to extend representation for the people.
When addressing the characteristics of democratic reform within British society in the
Victorian era, it is important to acknowledge the various interpreters of democracy who
presented concepts of cultural representation previously foreign to British interests (both
domestic and abroad) including Gladstone. By utilizing sources that incorporate ideas
both close to and distant from Gladstone’s agenda, a historian gains insight into a broader
context of Gladstone’s personal connection between social representation, democratic
tendencies, and Liberal reform.
Historians cover a significant range of attributes concerning Gladstonian policies
during the Victorian era. Among the issues examined, one finds bureaucratic intrigue,
economic tussles, and societal conflicts abounding and rampant throughout nineteenthcentury culture in Britain. This perception of national turmoil is of course a repetitive
theme in various societal transformations throughout British history. For example, Denis
Judd indicates that prior to the Victorian era, England and Ireland were in conflict over
the latter’s societal position within Empire. Their differences led to the 1800 Act of
Union which aggravated previous tensions between the two countries.1 Journalist
Geoffrey Bolton points to a general consensus by historians that the reason for said strife
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Denis Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present (London: BasicBooks, 1996),
40-41.
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between nations of the Commonwealth occurred due to a sense of English patriotism that
prevented a significant number of parliamentary representatives from observing Irish
subjects as equals in the British Empire, thereby prompting the subjugation of Ireland as
a nation in need of civilized guidance.
Interestingly, Bolton then counters this theory of English supremacy by alluding
to the likelihood that MPs genuinely feared for the stability of English trade interests with
Ireland (particularly the commodity of wool), thereby contributing to a “convenience” in
union between nations.2 Martin Pugh adds to Bolton’s perspective by suggesting that, as
early as the eighteenth century Ireland, Scotland, and Wales all fell under English disdain
to some degree, thereby indicating a prevailing sense of exclusion from the premise of an
actual “United” Kingdom.3 In either case, Britain clearly struggled during the eighteenth
century with a proper sense of nationalism and with a debatable concept of what
constituted true “British” representation. Gladstone directly addressed the debate over
representation throughout the majority of his career and was instrumental in extending
democratic changes to previously underrepresented groups such as the people of Ireland.
The sociopolitical status of Ireland within the United Kingdom, however, was
only one issue that festered prior to Gladstone’s emergence in the political realm.
Industrialization and the aftermath of the French Revolution both brought strife to
relationships in the British class system and prompted many within the Empire to seek a
voice that could represent them in Parliament. David Eastwood alludes to Elie Halevy’s
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works and they jointly label this period of the early nineteenth century as a “Liberal
awakening”.4 This particular revelation seemingly occurred in Gladstone after the 1850s.
Abraham Kriegel reinterprets the terminology used to describe the rise of British
liberalism as “Whig liberty.” Interestingly, however, Kriegel does imply that many
contemporary historians including John Russell and Henry Brougham were quick to label
liberty as a primary feature of “Whiggery” in contrast to the loyalist high-conservatism
that once defined a young Gladstone.5 Although Kriegel goes on to indicate that by the
early nineteenth century this particular sense of Whig liberty seemingly appealed to the
nobility rather than the common man. Kriegel also implies that the issue of liberty
through democratic reform actually began even before Gladstone’s premierships.6 In
other words, Gladstone may have served as a significant catalyst to the nineteenthcentury Liberal movement, but considerations aimed at greater democratic understanding
and regarding British citizens’ desires for further social representation via government
leaders had already taken root prior to Gladstonian reforms.
The socio-political issues which festered in Britain starting in 1832 (after the first
of three reform acts) served as catalyst that forever altered the face of Empire. A student
of this tumultuous period in British history should not presume that the efforts of a
singular individual or the ethics of an enlightened ideal had the capacity to completely
revolutionize the structure of the British imperial system. Therefore, as important to the
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period as Gladstone appears to be, he was part of a larger social transformation that was
growing in the minds of various British social groups.
Unlike the initial observations from several of Gladstone’s cabinet and from the
writings of his son, the scrutiny of modern historians such as Hugh Cunningham,
Jonathan Parry, and Martin Pugh seeks to comprehend a broader picture of the Liberal
movement in the nineteenth century rather than viewing Gladstone as a singular entity of
political persuasion. That is not meant to suggest that contemporary sources fail to
acknowledge the accomplishments of numerous MPs apart from Gladstone, nor is there
an indication that current historians readily disassociate Gladstone from the party that he,
in a sense, pioneered. However, Gladstone became the champion of several liberal causes
and introduced appropriate legislation to transition governmental policies toward said
goals.
The conclusion is, therefore, that the modern contributions overseeing
Gladstone’s personal approach to governance simply provides an expansive angle
focusing on the Gladstonian movement in the grander context of a transitioning Empire.
Furthermore, the historiographic presentation of Gladstonian ideals would remain
incomplete without the inclusion of the British population’s collective viewpoints
regarding his administrative capabilities. Newspapers, both Liberal and Conservative,
produced a plethora of content targeting various aspects of Gladstone’s political agenda
in such a way as to demonstrate that British people, while largely in agreement over a
need for stability within the government, did not readily concede to preferences over
leadership and representation. For example, certain newspapers such as The Evening
Telegraph and The Derby Mercury actively support Gladstone’s potential as a Liberal
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leader during the Midlothian Campaign whereas journalists and advertisements in
Grantham Journal advocate opportunities in property acquisition that benefit supporters
of Gladstone’s opponent, Lord Dalkeith.7 While understanding the words of Gladstone
goes far down the path of recognizing his policies, the accounts of Gladstone’s immediate
biographers and the testimonies of various contributors to Victorian era newspapers could
provide insight in determining the nature of Gladstonian representation. The perspective
of the latter sources must also feature for the sake of defining the uniqueness of this
democratic reform.
This thesis will cover several key issues of Gladstonian politics in order to
demonstrate the uniqueness of Gladstone’s perception of “true representation” through
democratic reform. Thus, it will also prove useful to summarize historians’ explanations
of each topic in order to reveal the significance of Gladstonian fundamentals within a
former imperial society largely governed through a sovereign English identity. For
example, J. Hammond and R. Foot immediately address their purpose to covering several
key histories of the British Empire including the accomplishments of Gladstone. In effect,
the authors suggest that the comprehension of Gladstonian principle is essential to
comprehending the politics of Germany, Soviet Russia, the United States, and the United
Kingdom, all of which reflected qualities of imperialistic nations.8 Based upon the
writing’s publication in the mid-twentieth century, it is possible that the aftermath of
World War II, the contributions of the Labour Party in wartime, and looming British
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decolonization served as relevant motivations for Hammond and Foot to comprehend the
national identity of Britain within the period in which they wrote. Gladstone then
naturally becomes a subject of interest during the mid-twentieth century as a historian
from the United States might perceive Franklin Roosevelt in present circumstances as a
past figure who brought about significant reform to a nation despite debates between the
benefits and detriments of his administration.
This motive to investigate Britain’s identity as a budding democratic society
within a period of national concern is actually similar to contemporary accounts of
Gladstone such as Richard Cook’s in which he bemoans a period of doubt soon after the
passing of Gladstone after the leader’s fourth premiership. Cook writes with a worried
tone and indicates that without the source of Gladstonian idealism (Gladstone himself),
the progression of Britain’s domestic and international roles as an example of democratic
reform remains dubious at best.9 Despite differences in the contemporary sources’ desires
to study Gladstone as an individual and current historians that aim to define Gladstonian
Liberalism, there exists a repetitive attempt by both groups to utilize his accomplishments
to gain a greater sense of Britain’s potential as a democratic society. Gladstone, along
with other British leaders, contributed to a modern sense of progressive democracy under
a parliament that clings to the banner of a constitutional monarchy.
When addressing academic perspectives surrounding Gladstone, it is crucial to
mention the outlook over the transition of the British government throughout the
nineteenth century related to democratic reform. Parry suggests that democratic reform
fully manifested itself in Britain during the 1830s with the passage of the 1832 Reform
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Act and the emergence of the Whig Party, both providing counter-points to Conservative
assertions that governmental authority should remain jointly shared between the laws of
Parliament and the decrees of the monarchy with both subject to a degree of
constitutionalism.10 Pugh adds to this observation by suggesting that Tory unity began to
wane just prior to the Reform Act because of the combined effects of middle class
desperation and Whig assurances which led to a rise of opportunists within the Whig
party.11 Parry continues by identifying the achievements of notable advocates supporting
progressive movements. Robert Peel grew disillusioned from High Conservatism and
subsequently inspired MPs including William Gladstone to contest former concepts of
democratic representation.12
Cunningham makes an essential point that “democracy” was not a clearly defined
term in the nineteenth century and that some within the United Kingdom despised the
notion altogether.13 From a modern standpoint on Victorian Liberalism, the determination
that democratic reform began after the 1832 Reform Act is then founded on the
possibility that broadened representation and the arrival of Liberal advocation are linked.
This is certainly plausible from a purely political standpoint, at least before the arrival of
twentieth century policies in which democratic reform no longer conformed to an issue of
representation within Britain per se. Rather, democratic representation clearly constitutes
a matter of delegation priorities within Empire. With respect to previous descriptions of
the Conservative-supported constitutional monarchy, it should also become clear that the
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mainstream Tory agenda did not necessarily exclude democracy from governmental
concerns. Jon Lawrence affirms Cunningham’s notion of a subjective application of
British democracy, and Lawrence even chides Conservative writers for lamenting the
inability of Tory leaders to readily adapt to the needs of various societal groups.14
Gladstone appears to follow this path as he transitioned from idealistic Conservatism to
pragmatic Liberalism.
It could be argued, however, that democracy as understood by most MPs proved
most valid when the cabinet adopted actions in the best interest of the people rather than
allowing the general population to directly decide the issue. However, despite this
apparent recognition of the term democracy as a genuine feature of British government,
William Jennings, in comparison to latter historians, surmises that the 1830s served as a
key period in which a largely conservative Britain began to rely on “public opinion.”15
By this time in parliamentary history, post-Gladstonian historians recognize a tenable fact
that the Whigs and, subsequently, the Liberals found a loophole through which to gain
greater political acceptance amongst British voters although they had yet to produce a
proponent that could reflect the ideals of greater representation and democratic reform.
Ian St. John includes an interesting point that Gladstone’s initial political
endeavors in university led him to actively protest the earlier drafts of reform in 1830. St.
John then borrows from David Bebbington’s viewpoint concluding that Gladstone
seemed apprehensive at the idea of democratic reform, and he believed that the current
government lay within the graces of divine sovereignty.16 Opinions differ in
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contemporary circles regarding the centrality of the 1832 Reform Act as the turning point
in the British position on democratic practices. The first Reform Act supported by the
Whigs did alter previous notions of a stable voting system by adding more borough seats
to Parliament. Parry even argues that the act “indirectly” provided the British populace
with greater political sway.17 However, Lawrence counters this premise of “genuine”
democratic change by indicating that the reform in 1832 did not increase representation
on an equal level for British citizens, but rather it hindered the democratic process by
cutting the voting rights of the labor force to a third of their initial numbers.18 Lawrence
is certainly correct and he confirms that democracy was far from the reach of the Whigs
at this point, but in fairness the act did imply that MPs became aware that the former
method of representation needed to change in order to realize a greater capacity for social
representation. St. John then continues by revealing that Gladstone critiqued his own
former views that manifested from his idealistic youth and he reassessed the misguided
passion that preceded his later principles.19 These points by St. John are essential to the
premise of this thesis regarding the convictions of Gladstone’s Anglicanism and the
influence of his High Conservatism because it shows a willingness by Gladstone to
maintain personal ethics rooted in his religion while altering former assumptions about
the connection between state and spirituality that in turn redefined his views of
democratic legislation.
Gladstone’s emerging and flexible adoption of representation within a nation
undergoing democratic reform is a key theme of this thesis. Therefore, it will be
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necessary to include in the historiographical examination the viewpoints of initial
biographers who seek to determine Gladstone’s character as well as later observers who
concern themselves with the significance of Gladstonian policy within Victorian Britain.
Undoubtedly, secondary examinations of Gladstone do include attempts to portray
Gladstone’s character and do not stray away from the patterns of earlier accounts in tying
his personal ethics together with his bureaucratic duties. In this regard, many of the later
scrutinizers of Gladstone maintain the theme of their predecessors. However, the
transition in historic focus largely appears to shift toward Gladstonian polity as a medium
for democratic reform during the latter part of the nineteenth century and as a catalyst for
societal change leading into the Edwardian era. Bebbington extends Gladstone’s
influence beyond that of the Edwardian period by stating that Gladstonian ideals prove
relevant in a modern context of the British political spectrum.20 Taking into account the
contrast between Gladstone’s contemporaries and modern commentators, it remains true
that there is little to no debate over the intent of Gladstone to bring about democratic
reform in Britain, but rather the difference lies between the focus on the motivations
behind his personal decisions as a political leader and the context of how a Gladstonian
revision could affect the course of Empire. An example of this contrast would be the
difference between Richard Cook who focuses on the character of Gladstone as an
individual and Parry who indicates that the goal of his accounts is to provide a historic
analysis of Victorian Era Liberalism which also includes information on Gladstonian
politics.21 These contemporary documentations of Gladstone (including those of James
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Bryce, Richard Cook, and John Morley who all shared closer ties to him than their
modern counterparts) focus on an intimate view of Gladstone rather than grouping his
influence as a part of the entirety of the Victorian political spectrum.
John Morley’s biographical account of Gladstone alludes to this perspective.
Morley readily admits to a struggle of maintaining historiographical relevancy while
addressing the “exploits, thoughts, and purposes” of Gladstone as a singular figure of
national scrutiny in the British Empire. Although Morley certainly does not exclude
Gladstone’s efforts to reform Britain as part of a greater historical contribution to the
Empire, his main goal surveys the characteristics of Gladstone which accomplished
recognizable feats of political and social acumen throughout his career.22 Likewise,
James Bryce also provides a primary source account of Gladstone’s career from a
perspective that seemingly aims to exemplify the man rather than democratic reform as a
nineteenth century movement. In fact, Bryce begins his writings on Gladstone by
informing the reader that they must include three traits that inescapably cling to his
accomplishments: “the first his Scottish blood, the second his Oxford education, the third
his apprenticeship to public life under Sir Robert Peel”.23 Morley and Bryce both served
as Liberal MPs with Gladstone. Historical consideration suggests that their
understandings of his contributions to democratic reform in Britain are limited by their
immediate concerns within Parliament and their personal views of Gladstone as a
parliamentary leader. For example, it is interesting that Bryce opts to exclude Gladstone’s
Anglicanism as a fourth motivation in his political endeavors within this particular
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passage.24 This fact demonstrates that contemporary sources appear selective in their
examinations of Gladstonian governance.
One might suggest that Gladstone’s religious ethics were not essential to his
governmental policies, but Gladstone refutes this possibility through his own
correspondence, much of which highlights his belief in the necessity of religion as a
staple for running matters of state.25 Bryce also includes a chapter in his writings that
openly concedes to the relevance of Gladstone’s religious influences. Thus, Bryce did not
necessarily seek to eliminate Anglican virtue from Gladstonian policy. As a modern
scholar reflecting on Gladstone’s motivations, Bebbington creates an entire narrative
surrounding his stance on the Church and its relationship to the State, indicating that the
man’s faith proved so “transparent” that it permeated the essence of his decisiveness
concerning political endeavors.26 Obviously, Bryce was aware of Gladstone’s loyalty to
the Church of England and probably assumed that the reader would include Anglicanism
as a given aspect in Gladstonian administration or perhaps recognized that Anglicanism
accounted for part of his upbringing. Hammond and Foot issue another possibility for
Bryce’s supposed hesitation to label Anglicanism as an isolated trait in Gladstonian
politics in that a considerable number of Liberal MP’s did support religious principles.
However, Liberals often distinguished between religion and governmental affairs
therefore implying that Gladstone’s approach was both controversial and unique.27 That
is not to say that the majority of MPs shunned religion, but rather that they advocated for
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the isolation of issues of state from spiritual matters. Therefore, Bryce may have also
distanced Gladstone’s Anglicanism from that of the overall Liberal pursuit of democratic
reform.
Because religious tenets were only part of the overall perspective, Gladstone’s
views on democratic reform are also instructive regarding his personal philosophy.
Gladstone clearly did not achieve a complete overhaul of parliamentary policies in the
form of direct voting rights indicative of Greek practices or in the model of a federal
republic espousing democratic values reflective of the United States. On the contrary, he
did support to some degree the sovereignty of Britain’s constitutional monarchy, and Roy
Jenkins even states that when Gladstone gained his first premiership as a Liberal, there
was “nothing of Whiggery about him”.28 Parry also maintains that Gladstone personally
held fast to many religious morals and conservative ethics both prior to and during his
time as a Liberal leader. For example, Gladstone emphasized the importance of liberty
for the people, yet without religious conviction, these freedoms could never last due to
the nature of sin29 Bebbington labels Gladstone as a “career politician” yet still maintains
that he never left his personal principles although he did often recognize the practicality
of party appeasement despite contrast to his own opinions.30 Lawrence links these
bureaucratic elements of Gladstonian politics to the broader term of “conservative
Liberalism” as opposed to mainstream Whiggery or radical Liberalism, thereby
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acknowledging Gladstone’s leanings toward Conservative policies.31 In other words,
contemporary historians seem to agree that Gladstone advocated traits of conservatism
and combined this attribute with the objectives of the Liberal Party, but never went so far
as to lean toward the radical-left position of anti-imperialism. Instead, Gladstone
contributed to the transition of a largely Conservative society rooted in English
sovereignty into a redefined empire conscious of the need to expand its limited
understanding of domestic representation by employing elements of British democracy
while he addressed the expectations of his Liberal supporters.
Conservative values provide a foundation from which Gladstone evolved as a
political leader. Regarding historians’ views on Gladstone’s early influences, Graham
Goodlad implies that part of Gladstone’s uniqueness as an advocate for Liberal reforms
was in fact his affiliation with the Peelites. Despite the endeavors of other Whig-Liberal
MPs to court the affections of the people and even the attention of radicals, whose
passions against Conservatives led them to seek options outside of imperialistic rule,
Gladstone’s ethical convictions and his oratory skills allowed him to garner a deep-seated
respect within the Peelite movement.32 Goodlad also alludes that Gladstonian politics did
not originate solely from Gladstone himself, credence must also be given to elements of
Peelite ideals.33 Considering that the Peelite movement had a profound influence on
Gladstone’s political perspective, it is plausible that Gladstonian Liberalism emerged as a
hybrid concept between Robert Peel’s movement and Gladstone’s own personal ethics. It
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is also true that Gladstone was not without his own critiques of Peel, despite his favorable
position amidst the other members of the movement. Historian J. B. Conacher states in an
article regarding Peel and his followers that Gladstone questioned an apparent lack of
emotion by Peel on the gravity of leaving the Conservative Party.34 Conacher reveals a
significant difference between Gladstone and his mentor in that the former recognized a
shift in principle among the Tories that apparently grieved him. In other words, it seems
obvious that while Gladstone willingly pursued objectives linked to the Peel movement,
he was loath to give up certain ideals that he still attributed to traditional conservatism.
Most of the historiographers covering Gladstone seek to outline his various
accomplishments and the motivations behind his career choices, but it is also necessary to
examine what historians perceive regarding the definition of Gladstonian Liberalism.
Interestingly, most historians do not label Gladstonian Liberalism within one section of
their writings, but rather pick out specific ideals held by Gladstone that, when combined,
form a greater coherence of the term. David Nicolls borrows from Walter Bagehot’s
firsthand perception of the British monarchy and indicates that Gladstonian Liberalism
emerged as a response to the dwindling power of the monarchy. Although Gladstone had
great respect for Queen Victoria, Nicholls concludes that he and Bagehot recognized a
need to embrace “social and ideological influence” while still adhering to the ethical
compass of constitutionalism.35 Martin Pugh alludes to this combination of interests by
Gladstone as the staple for at least two decades of his political career. In addition, Pugh
lists two principal traits of Gladstonian politics as “the pursuit of free trade and the
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development of individual freedom”.36 Parry certainly supports the first of these two
concepts and asserts that Gladstone’s experience as Chancellor of the Exchequer allowed
him a “high profile conception of budgets” which he used to alter earlier Liberal
approaches to fiscal responsibilities by “checking spending”.37 Eugenio Biagani cites
historian John Vincent and alludes to the second of Pugh’s labeled Gladstonian
principles, individual freedom, by informing his readers that Gladstone pursued Irish
Home Rule with a passion related to a seemingly genuine desire to realize a sense of
equality for Ireland within the United Kingdom.38 In his biography of Gladstone, Jenkins
readily points to religion as a necessary feature of Gladstonian polity since it could not be
separated from Gladstone’s professional character, although at times the former prime
minister seemingly believed the government incapable of fully employing Christian
principles within its daily practice.39 Finally, Gladstone, by his own admission, identifies
Anglicanism as a central belief throughout his career that provided an ethical absolute
within a government immersed in subjective ideals not always reflective of his own.40
These all form the body of Gladstonian Liberalism and the impetus behind his reforms.
The general consensus by historians seems to surmise that Gladstonian politics
were a conglomeration of several key elements that, when placed together, alter the initial
concept of mainstream Liberalism. In summary, a historiographic definition of
Gladstonian Liberalism includes the following: that he embraced an innovative approach
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to individual representation relevant to nineteenth century societal progression, that he
produced financial reforms supported by Liberal-leaning policy via checking government
spending as well as limiting government taxation, and that he retained a number of
former conservative principles accompanied by an unmoving devotion to Anglican
ethics. The merging of these facets of Gladstonian polity provide an enlightening
viewpoint to a modern perspective of his reforms in Empire. Conclusively, Gladstonian
Liberalism did not represent a singularly conservative agenda, nor did he conform to a
purely liberal philosophy. In retrospect, the emergence of Gladstonian Liberalism
incorporated a malleable and gradual progression towards British representation within a
Victorian society amenable to democratic reform.
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CHAPTER II

DISESTABLISHMENT

Support of state-sanctioned religion is a hallmark of many European countries.
Gladstone’s affiliation with the Anglican Church provided him with a loyalty to the
institution while the Christian tenets within Anglicanism pointed to the inequity of
society. As a result of that expected loyalty, one of the more controversial aspects of his
career lie in his approach to the Established Churches in both Scotland and Ireland. It is
also prudent to include the idea that England’s religious influence over the rest of Britain
did not solely refer to differences in denominational interpretations of the Scriptures. This
allowed imperialists to maintain domestic sovereignty through the Church as English and
Irish perspectives filtered through an Anglican clergy while Scotland retained, to some
degree, its own religious governance. Jonathan Parry asserts that debates over the matter
of Church and State prompted an unease amongst politicians due to the “sensitive” nature
of the role of the State in religious matters, particularly in Ireland.41 One might suspect
that Gladstone’s position would not sway in favor of disestablishment for either nation as
both fell under a dominant relationship of Church and State which he professedly
supported. Furthermore, Gladstone’s former high conservative dogma surely would have
at the least reminded the MP of his previous belief in a government structured by
41
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Anglican principles which would extend to Ireland. However, it is also apparent that even
Anglicanism may have taken a secondary position to Gladstone’s desire to appease
members of the United Kingdom who were not directly linked to his British conservative
priorities. Essentially, Gladstone continuously increased his support of liberal reform to
reflect Britain’s progressive interests, which in turn, demonstrated one of the unique
aspects of Gladstonian politics in that his policymaking did not remain static in practice,
but exhibited malleability for the sake of representative appeasement. For example, Parry
explains that Gladstone began as a High Conservative Anglican but altered his political
demeanor by the late 1860s in favor of non-conformist endeavors to disestablish the
Anglican church in Ireland, thereby ensuring further support of the Liberal Party by Irish
citizens.42 Ian St. John then addresses an important element that defined the progression
of Gladstonian ethics from a conservative base to a liberal platform. St. John states that
Gladstone always desired to pursue the “good of the state”; however, his former ideals
transformed by recognizing the essential element of individual liberty over that of
bureaucratic authority.43 From the perspective of these accounts, Gladstone’s decision to
entertain notions about disestablishment seems to pose a direct contrast to his personal
ethics and to the mainstream Conservative stance in Parliament that insisted that the
Church system must retain a position of authority within the immediate boundaries of the
British Empire. In short, Gladstone’s differing approach between church disestablishment
for Ireland and for Scotland demonstrated a struggle that reflected his considerations of
liberal representation over that of traditional practices.
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The origins of Anglicanism in the sixteenth-century and its role with government
throughout the seventeenth-century may loosely connect to its status in Victorian Britain.
However, its association to Ireland, Scotland, and Gladstone must garner discussion to
reveal the roots of the relationship with this religion’s sovereignty over the British state.
The Church of England historically traces back to Henry VIII and his disputation with
Catholicism owing to a dispute over monarchal authority, and particularly regarding his
right to divorce Catherine of Aragon. This is not an unknown part of England’s history to
be sure and should direct observers to acknowledge that the Church of England did not
emerge solely to contest Catholicism, but also arose in protest to the authority of the
Pope, exchanging his headship for that of a British monarch. In fact, these facets of the
origins of the Anglican Church are directly addressed by author George Bernard who
states, more to the point, that despite disagreements by historians over the true architect
of Anglicanism that “religious policy was very much the king’s policy”.44 In other words,
the Anglican system allowed England’s ruler a sanctioned level of divine authority
previously unrecognized by his subjects, thereby promoting a greater degree of
bureaucratic sovereignty which in practice could potentially extend to British Parliament.
The Anglican Church and the responsibilities of Britain’s government
transformed yet again in the seventeenth-century in the aftermath of the English Civil
War. Under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell, the influence of the monarchy diminished
and by default the king’s divine Anglican authority was relinquished to a government led
by Parliament. It is also true that Cromwell did not allow Parliament to continue in favor
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of a temporary commonwealth.45 Cromwell’s ideals in the seventeenth-century eventually
contributed to the early nineteenth-century notions of democratic reform because he
emphasized the importance of a nation led by the people rather than led by an absolute
ruler or by a corrupt parliament. Incidentally, Cromwell did not follow through on his
promises to install democratic measures as he adopted an autocracy over his
Commonwealth, but it is feasible that his initial tendencies towards democracy, limited as
they were, retained their value during the Victorian Era. In contrast to this possibility,
however, Blair Worden notes that current historians seem to take a perspective that
Cromwell’s Puritan religion and even the influence of the Anglican Church may have
simply served as a medium through which to discuss the other matters of bureaucratic
interest.46 If this assertion is accurate then it gives greater credence that religious
perception would continue as a tool through which the British government could pursue
political agendas by demonstrating a “spiritual responsibility” to the nation. It would not
be prudent to suggest that Cromwell or MPs that professed to follow a form of
denominational Christianity were false to their own religious principles out of political
corruption. Rather, it is probable that Britain’s obvious ties to religious fervor provided
opportunities for the government to further its own agendas fueled by a combination of
spiritual zeal and bureaucratic responsibility. Furthermore, Cromwell’s actions, according
to J. Gordon Eaker, prompted idealists such as Richard Hooker to rethink the validity of
Anglicanism as a suitable rival to Puritan leadership, thereby reigniting an interest in the
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“Divine Law” of the Scriptures.47 Despite the former strife between the various
movements of the Church and State in Britain, Anglicanism retained its status as an
authoritative moral structure intrinsically fundamental to English society, including
individuals such as Gladstone, although it was not necessarily representative of other
religious denominations in the United Kingdom.
The examination of the events above reveal an important, informative part in
understanding Gladstone and his approach to the disestablishment of the Churches in
Ireland and Scotland, especially since the latter abrogation did not conform to Anglican
sovereignty concerns. Clearly each of these religious disputes, including King Henry’s
break from Catholicism and Cromwell’s challenge to an Anglican-led monarchal
sovereignty, possesses its own historic individuality within its immediate frame of
occurrence. However, these struggles also connect via a continuous pattern of British
consideration of the legitimacy of Church-combined-with-State, particularly in relevance
to Anglican jurisdiction within Britain. Gladstone himself recognized this Anglican
authority to the point of fervent but not wholly undisputed loyalty which was obviously
defined by his personal approach to the enactment of Irish disestablishment. In reference
to the Anglican Church, Gladstone indicates in his writings that the term “Church and
State” is inseparable from the realm of politics, and he believed that the governing body
of Britain must “profess” the principles of Christianity to instill ethical guidance for the
nation.48 It should be noted that this passage in Gladstone’s publication emerged from his
zeal as a young and budding politician; one who saw potential in a harmonious
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relationship between “Church and State” but who did not necessarily assume that British
Parliament had already embraced such a practice. In fact, Gladstone seems to infer that,
apart from within Britain, the administration of a dominant Anglican Church to every
corner of the empire was not realistic simply owing to the plethora of complex belief
systems attempting to intertwine under the sovereignty of a single Christian
denomination.49 John Morley also adds to Gladstone’s perspective, stating that around the
MP’s early career some in the government insisted:
The church was not the nation; that it was not identical with parliament who spoke
for the nation; that it had no longer a title to compose the governing order; and a
more startling disclosure still to the minds of churchmen-that laws affecting the
church would henceforth be made by men of all churches and creeds, or even men
of none.50
David Bebbington also comments on the the state of Anglicanism in the nineteenthcentury, indicating that many British citizens believed that the Anglican Church had
embraced secular matters to the point that it had become too political.51 It is possible that
Gladstone applied a similar theory to the Established Anglican Church in Ireland and to
the Established Presbyterian Church of Scotland, viewing both regions as individual
nations capable of maintaining their own religious principles while remaining adherent to
British Anglicanism.
One should not assume, however, that Gladstone utilized an identical solution of
reform for the Church of Ireland and for that of the Church of Scotland despite this
personal revelation. Those differing responses result from the fact that they did not
possess the same level of political interest or religious concern regarding Gladstone as a
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liberal mediator of British agendas. It is helpful to understand that Scotland’s
Presbyterian majority public accepted its Established Church since the institution was
also Presbyterian. The Established Anglican Church in Ireland, on the other hand, only
possessed a minority of Anglican supporters while the vast majority of the Irish identified
as Catholic. Alan O’Day adds that by the 1860s the Irish Catholics pushed heavily for
disestablishment and, coupled with the rising Fenian movement, the issue of the
Established Anglican Church in Ireland became extremely significant in comparison to
the mildly contested Scottish Church.52 Irish voters supportive of disestablishment
received greater attention under Gladstone’s premiership, whereas their Scottish
counterparts met with a less enthusiastic degree of support by Gladstone likely for the
sake of garnering dual-sided political backing from Scotland’s constituents. However, the
former prime minister’s nearly laissez-faire approach to Scottish disestablishment
suggests that Ireland actually proved to be the true priority of Gladstonian reform
regarding religious liberties.
At this point of consideration, Gladstone’s stance on spirituality and its position in
the Established Churches is relevant to his career because it influenced him in pursuing
liberal reform, instilling democratic values, and contemplating disestablishment. His
loyalties to the principles of the Church of England cannot distinguish nor depart from his
decisions regarding disestablishment since they are so clearly marked through his own
correspondence. Parry asserts that the prospect of Church disestablishment was not a
subject that met with universal agreement under the Liberal agenda as the Whigs largely
contested the benefits of including the spiritual element from British governance.53 This
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point by Parry suggests the likelihood that by the 1860s Gladstone, evidenced by support
of Irish and Scottish disestablishment, had reached a position that favored the
representation of his liberal followers in those nations over British Whig approval,
thereby suggesting that democratic elements were present in the consideration process of
contesting the Established Church system. Gladstone effectively broke away from
mainstream Whig position to assure Ireland’s appeasement, thereby allowing for political
comfort from a Scotch/Irish angle as well as from a nonconformist stance. Furthermore,
Gladstone did not abandon his Anglican principles after disestablishment in Ireland even
though by appearance he directly contradicted his own desire to maintain a United
Kingdom integrated with Anglicanism.
Irish dissatisfaction with Established Church principles arose in British society
previous to Gladstone’s involvement. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact year that Irish
constituents first expressed annoyance with the Anglican Church, but it is safe to
conclude that tensions developed at least as early as 1798. Pugh reveals that just before
this date, Prime Minister William Pitt attempted to appease Irish Catholics through
sanctions that allowed greater freedoms over societal parameters such as educational
stipulations and domestic practices. Pugh continues by indicating that Pitt’s motivations
seemed more focused on avoiding potential aggression by the United Irishmen and by the
French who were siding with Irish rebels. The French did in fact dispatch an invasion
force in 1796, but in retrospect little changed due to their initial coming. The true
uprising against England however did not commence until two years after the arrival of
French troops to support Ireland.54
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Poor weather initially hindered the efforts of the French navy, thereby
jeopardizing efforts to land along Ireland’s coastline and preventing any significant
progress for France’s military objectives. A century later, Katharine Hinkson describes
the incident of the French invasion as a merely amusing affair in that British families
thought France’s attempts to invade Ireland were little more than a blustering endeavor
hampered by the tumultuous coasts surrounding the British Isles.55 Thomas Pakenham
provides a differing tone to the issue by stating that Ireland’s rebellion in spite of
France’s failures proved anything but humorous, leading to the deaths of over 30,000
men including commoners. This struggle, in turn, prompted Pitt to install desperate
measures of subjugation that seeded strife between England and Ireland for decades.56 In
short, the French invasion was a blunder, but it did not prevent Irish Catholics and
Protestants from challenging British authority over the matter of their national liberty.
Denis Judd also writes on the issue of the 1798 uprising stating that the Irish Catholics’
and Protestants’ defeat against England allowed the latter to subdue the land as part of a
“United” Kingdom by the passing of the 1801 Act of Union.57 Incidentally, Mary Condon
produces a key piece of historic context regarding the relationship between the Act of
Union and the Established Irish Church. Condon states that although Irish and English
Anglicanism shared common ideas, it was from the Act of Union in 1801 that they
officially merged as joint bodies of religious governance.58 Though victorious in an
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imperial sense, Britain’s subjugation of Ireland administered greater animosity than from
previous Irish grievances and thus sparked a desire to seek representation for Church
disestablishment from British governance which eventually gained the interest of a
newly-elected Prime Minister Gladstone in 1868.
The matter over disestablishment from the Anglican Church garnered further and
extensive consideration in Ireland in the 1830s under the Whig-Liberal party in Britain.
Robert Mermagen concludes that, although the previous statement is true, it does not
mean that the Whigs concurred over the matter of reform for the Established Church.
Mermagen along with Condon asserts that the matter of complaint from Irish Catholics
related to a mandatory tithing system under the auspices of the Tithe Commutation Acts
established in 1823 and 1824. However, Mermagen seems to disagree with Condon on
whether the issue of tithing was the sole factor that incurred Irish Catholic wrath, and he
argues (in similar fashion to Scotland’s debates regarding disestablishment, discussed
later in the chapter) that the discord linked to a greater matter of the relationship between
Church and State.59 Hugh Cunningham adds to this debate of Catholic sentiment for
antiestablishment and introduces two key features of the issue. First, the Catholics were
not alone in admitting discomfort over the Tithing Acts as in fact, Presbyterians also
shared this apparent consternation under the Established Church in Ireland. Second, the
Anglican Church that incorporated these two denominations amounted to merely seven
percent of the population, thereby suggesting that a significant number of Irish citizens
did not profess loyalty to the supposed “sovereign” institution of Anglicanism.60 By this
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point around the early 1830’s, Gladstone’s political career as a Tory politician was
budding, his loyalty to the Anglican Church, and to the High Conservative establishment
did not yet contest with the virtues laid down by the Peelite movement.61 St. John stresses
that during the issue of Irish dissatisfaction, Gladstone, through his published work The
State in its Relations with the Church in 1838, maintained that Britain should embrace a
“religious nationality” with Anglicanism at the head of government. However, St. John
also asserts that, even at the time of publication, Gladstone was already maturing towards
a more liberal mindset in which he began to recognize the complexity of Britain and the
various needs of the United Kingdom that an Anglican-centered government might fail to
address.62 John Hammond affirms that Gladstone’s writings, while reflective of a young
man’s passion for his chosen faith, merely echoed the musings of a fervent idealist fired
by an Evangelical stance which, in time, transformed toward more practical religious
tolerance.63 This set of revelations by Gladstone reveal at least two key elements to his
personal approach to liberal politics. The first apparent truth is that Gladstone, while
loyal to the Established Anglican Church, did not remain on a fixed set of objectives.
Rather, Gladstone’s passions combined with an eventual bureaucratic wisdom to adhere
to the expectations of his respective party while still holding fast to his spiritual ethics. A
second conclusion includes that the principle of the established religious body in Britain
and Ireland served as a significant topic of interest for Gladstone during his first
premiership.
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The promotion of Gladstone to Prime Minster in 1868 is partially owed to his
decision to support non-conformists on the issue of disestablishment of the Church of
Ireland. Cunningham mentions that, until 1865, Gladstone had not yet pushed the issue of
religious reform in Ireland although, when he saw potential in garnering non-conformist
support for the Liberal Party, he readily adopted the challenge. The author states,
however, that while Gladstone’s sudden decision to consider disestablishment may have
certainly appeared politically motivated, he was “empathetically earnest and serious”
because he refused to ignore the application of spiritual matters within those of
bureaucratic goals.64 Furthermore, maintaining good relations with non-conformists
forced Gladstone to side with a group considered by some to be radicalized against the
High Church of which he himself retained membership.65 By siding with non-conformists
on Irish disestablishment, Gladstone revealed that he would not rely solely on the
opinions of properly vested political groups within Britain, thereby extending his
democratic sentiments to voters beyond those endowed with political prominence.
Interestingly, Gladstone’s policies supporting Irish disestablishment extended to
Jamaica in 1870. Jamaica’s distance from Britain as well as its former ties to slavery
might have prompted Gladstone to ignore any cries for disestablishment by the island
colonists. However, Gladstone’s former endeavors to protest slavery despite his father’s
previous holdings in the colony provided the statesmen with a moral reason to ponder the
possibility of Jamaican disestablishment which would ensure extended freedoms for
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colonists.66 Jamaica also shared an essential attribute with the Irish in that the majority of
the population did not express loyalty to Anglicanism. Therefore, Gladstone agreed to the
disestablishment of the Church of England in Jamaica in 1870 allowing the colony to
obtain the same religious independence that Ireland received the previous year.67 In other
words, Gladstone, despite his obvious political motivations, could not refute his Christian
duty to realize the needs of British subjects at home and overseas when a majority of
them pleaded for religious independence from the established Anglican institution. This
trait of representation reflected the facets of Gladstonian Liberalism even when it
conflicted with Gladstone’s former principles as a Tory and as an Anglican because in the
cases of Ireland and Jamaica, traditional principle gave way to democratic adherence.
Another factor existed which Gladstone could scarcely ignore in the form of an
unsuccessful Fenian opposition to British authority in 1867 that coincided with the Irish
Catholics’ continued struggle against the Anglican Church. O’Day directly addresses
Gladstone’s attitude toward both the Fenians’ imprisonment in England and the Irish
Catholics’ complaints of Anglican Church oppression by indicating that confronting
Liberal Unionism, advocating Christian principles, protecting Catholic rights to religious
liberty, and even furthering Catholic interests in educational reforms all played a role in
Gladstone’s decision to enact Irish disestablishment by 1869.68 This inclusion by O’Day
acknowledges a core attribute of Gladstonian Liberalism in that the Prime Minister was
willing to abandon former assumptions about Ireland’s status as a British subject by
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collaborating with the Fenians and the Catholics against the authority of the Established
Church and against English sovereignty.
Perception on the benefits of Gladstone’s Irish Church Act varied within the
voices of the British media as some seemingly embraced the potential liberties that
disestablishment could bring, whereas other differing opinions suggested cautionary
observations so that the act did not make radical changes to the Established Church
system. For example, an article from Irish newsletter Freeman's Journal and Daily
Commercial Advertiser, openly praises the efforts of Gladstone and others among
Britain’s government who involved themselves in the process of the Irish Church Act as
it eased debts and land rates for Irish Church Tenants.69 While it does not directly
describe an effect of Church independence from Anglicanism, the article clarifies that
through this measure Gladstone and proponents of the Irish Church Act were able to
advocate for tenants in Ireland whose previous financial dealings proved incompatible
with their societal position. Alternatively, the Irish Church Act was not without its critics
in England and some acknowledged that the immediate results of the act in 1869
exhibited minor alterations to the Irish clergy and provided little change toward
disestablishment. In contrast, these same journalists recognized that the Irish Church Act
served as a bill comprised of stages to conclude in 1871 when the authority of the
Anglican Church in Ireland predictably dissolved, thereby completing a promise by
Gladstone to his non-conformist followers.70 Interestingly, the Non-Conformists did not
necessarily trust that Gladstone could achieve the full potential of disestablishment
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through the Act in 1869. Merely a few days after the publication of the previous article, a
source seemingly supportive of a non-conformist perspective openly speculates on the
trustworthiness of the bill. That source suggested the change, while apparent, might prove
passive with little stable assurance that the act would retain its supposed guarantees of
religious liberties.71 These media accounts suggest a significant risk by Gladstone, who
likely understood the failure to pass a viable bill in the dawning of his first premiership,
could amount to political suicide or, at the very least, might indicate that his
administrative abilities lacked conviction. Gladstone, however, did succeed in producing
the Irish Church Act, signifying that his goals seemed genuine and that he willingly
embraced the needs of constituents who stood apart from mainstream parliamentary
interests. While political manipulation certainly features as an element of Gladstonian
Liberalism, the Irish Church Act provided the first official means through which
Gladstone demonstrated a propensity for broader representation and progressive reform.
To accurately access the history of the Established Churches of the United
Kingdom in the nineteenth-century, it is helpful to understand that Ireland and Scotland
did not receive the same approach by Gladstone. The Irish Church’s disestablishment
openly met with Gladstone’s active support, yet the same level of response is not seen
regarding the Church of Scotland. It is possible that Gladstone simply viewed the troubles
in Ireland as a dire situation of religious misrepresentation in comparison to Scottish
concerns which, by appearance, seemed more docile in nature. There is also the factor
that Gladstone possessed Scottish heritage and strong ties to the Episcopal Church of
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Scotland which, in turn, may have promoted a reluctance by Gladstone to challenge the
Scottish religious bodies.72 Bebbington states:
Gladstone was more aware than most Anglicans of other Christian traditions. His
Scottish background gave him a personal acquaintance with Presbyterian worship.
In Scotland, the Established Church had repudiated bishops in the seventeenth
century and preferred more austere orders of service. But when in Scotland,
Gladstone was a devoted son of the Episcopal Church.73
Along the same issue of the Church loyalties, Bebbington adds another key fact
asserting that “the Scottish Episcopal Church was the counterpart of the Church of
England,” thereby suggesting a common root of Anglicanism.74 Pugh suggests another
likelihood stating that by the latter half of the nineteenth-century Scotland recognized
Liberals as their best advocates with a number of British leaders serving as
representatives to the Scottish seats in Parliament including Gladstone.75 In effect,
Scotland seemed more likely to adhere to their representatives in parliament as opposed
to the Irish who may have taken a position of aggressive assertion to garner greater
attention from the British government over religious freedom. In other words, Scotland
seemingly did not show the same level of instability over religious and political matters
as did Ireland, thereby prompting Gladstone to focus on the latter as a more prudent
target for his liberal reforms. Gladstone certainly did not feign interest in the matter of
Scottish disestablishment; however, and it is obvious that he did contemplate religious
liberty for the nation at least from an internal standpoint.
Another reason that Gladstone may have opted to observe Scottish
disestablishment with less enthusiasm than his interests in Ireland links to the previous
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Disruption of 1843. Scotland shared similar dissatisfaction with the Irish over employing
a clergy in the form of the Church of Scotland that was answerable to state policy and
thereby, by proxy, was under English sovereignty. In response, Dr. David Welsh and Dr.
Thomas Chalmers instituted a new form of religious governance titled the Free Church of
Scotland. Journalist Harold Laski defines this act as a direct challenge to the Established
Church in Scotland, but one that did not erupt from a disagreement over denominational
interpretation as both movements professed a Presbyterian background. Rather, the
debate fell on whether the Church answered to Christ directly or answered to the State
even in religious matters. The term utilized by Laski is societas perfecta which alludes to
an idea that the Church is self-sufficient and not bound to State authority, which Laski
asserts is a belief found in early Scottish ecclesiastical principles.76 To a considerable
degree this movement of the Free Church of Scotland proved successful and garnered the
support of the Scottish liberals, thus providing a pressure point for Scotland and for the
Liberal Party in seeking disestablishment beginning in 1874.77 Furthermore, there were
those in Ireland who openly supported the efforts of Dr. Welsh and Dr. Chalmers made
apparent in an article by the Belfast News-Letter. The author praises the Free Church of
Scotland for leaving the “enslaved Church of Scotland” going so far as to criticize landowners for refusing to distribute property to the supporters of the movement.78
Interestingly, Kellas acknowledges these resistant individuals as “tory landowners” and
alludes to the fact that the Free Church of Scotland incorporated a considerable amount of
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liberal supporters as opposed to the Church of Scotland whose conservative clergy
members outnumbered liberal clergymen of the denomination by over 1000:1.79 In
retrospect, the emergence of the Free Church of Scotland provided Gladstone with a
staunch liberal foothold in the region that might have otherwise fell to conservative
influence. This is a key element to Gladstonian reform concerning disestablishment in
Scotland which constitutes both personal and political aspirations of the former prime
minister. Effectively, the removal of the Established Church in Scotland would force
Gladstone to challenge his own personal ties to the practices of his traditional Scottish
Presbyterian heritage which likely factored into his reluctance to pursue the issue with the
same fervor as he did in Ireland. However, supporting disestablishment appeased
Gladstone’s Free Church supporters and provided him with a strong political front in
Scotland that remained despite the fact that he did not accomplish denominational Church
reform. In short, Gladstone, was willing to place his own position of Church and State
authority behind his desire to both acquire Scottish support and to ponder an eventual
disestablishment, thereby suggesting that his agenda for reform temporarily overcame his
religious principles.
Although Gladstone did not actively pursue Scottish disestablishment, it would be
misleading to ignore his involvement on the matter since he clearly derived political
comfort from his support of the issue. However, it is equally necessary to address his
considerations of Scottish disestablishment during 1880 at Midlothian which presents an
early example of a modern democratic campaign. For the Free Church members in
Scotland, Gladstone’s campaign was an opportunity to remind Gladstone via his Scottish
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Liberal followers about his former assurances that he would support Scottish
disestablishment.80 Kellas states that Gladstone also advocated for the Scottish electoral
body in which provided the proponents of disestablishment with the idea that Gladstone
was there for their needs.81 Finally, Alan Simon adds that in 1877 Lord Hartington
guaranteed that Gladstone would zealously tackle disestablishment if a significant
number of Scottish citizens agreed with the need for such reform.82 Gladstone, however,
made a questionable response to his Scottish supporters by indicating that his priorities
did not include disestablishment, though he would consider pursuing the issue if a greater
number of Scotsmen voiced their concerns on the matter, thereby repeating his previous
pledge.83
Despite his general emphasis on the importance of representation for the sake of
liberal reform, this failure seems to be a rare moment in Gladstone’s career in which he
seemingly relinquishes the apparent interests of his Scottish political backers, despite his
previous assurances that he would address the question of disestablishment. A relative
disagreement over the priority of the topic seems unlikely within Gladstone since he
would continue to consider disestablishment for Scotland even in the latter period of his
parliamentary career. In fact, Roy Jenkins states that as late as 1891 Gladstone, via his
immediate followers, included a renewal of the examination over the prospect of
disestablishment in Scotland despite evidence that Gladstone’s primary focus was Irish
Home Rule at the time.84 This concentration is not a surprising development for
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Gladstonian Liberalism since Home Rule proved to be one of the most relevant examples
of his progressive reforms. However, Jenkins’ account also suggests that disestablishment
never vacated Gladstone’s sympathies. Although Gladstone never did obtain
disestablishment for Scotland, that concept still reflects the measure of his interest in
representation for constituents who stood apart from the established Church.
Scotland’s religious history is comparable to Ireland’s in that there was at least a
measure of societal distress over the Established Church, but, as stated previously, it did
not elicit the same amount of concern for Gladstone as did the Irish plight. Citizens from
both nations seemed concerned with the level of authority that the State should possess
over the Established Church. However, Ireland and Scotland did not share the same
denominational majority with the former containing mainly Catholics and the latter
professing a large Presbyterian population. This may seem nothing more than a minor
difference of spiritual interpretation until one takes into account that the members of the
Established Anglican Church in Ireland only constituted a small percentage of potential
political supporters whereas that Established Presbyterian Church in Scotland reflected
the bulk of its domestic population.
Kellas proposes that Gladstone showed little interest in jeopardizing his goodwill
with English voters who still maintained that the Established Scottish Church was
acceptable to the alternative.85 Parry adds that since a number of English Whig-Liberals
supported the Established Church in Scotland, there seemed little reason to disrupt an
existing denominational system that appeared to function adequately in similar fashion to
the Church of England.86 In other words, Gladstone seemingly derived minimal benefit
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from pursuing disestablishment in Scotland since his Free Church supporters would
continue to pursue his favor as long an opposing candidate did not present himself as a
champion for Scotland’s societas perfecta. Furthermore, by remaining fairly neutral over
the status of Scotland’s Church and State, it is logical to conclude that both the Free
Church liberals and the pro-establishment conservatives assumed Gladstone might turn to
their favor, thereby making him the safest political bet. Cunningham confirms this
possibility of retaining political backing for Gladstone by stating that a Conservative
weak point toward the latter half of the nineteenth-century was, in fact, the reluctance to
provide solutions for the religious issues in Wales and in Scotland prompting both
nations to retain their support of the Liberal Party as the medium to embody their cause.87
While an element of bureaucratic tact clearly exists in Gladstone’s position regarding
Scottish neutrality, he was also maintaining a democratic front by attempting to appease
both sides of Scotland’s sociopolitical spectrum. By appearing neutral over Scottish
disestablishment Gladstone demonstrated an aspect of his liberalism that, combined with
personal principles, preserved the integrity of Church and State while allowing for the
possibility of future change.
In summary, Gladstone’s endeavors in religious reforms for both Scotland and
Ireland reflect significant attributes of his unique form of liberal reform. It is true that he
never obtained disestablishment for Scotland as Ireland seemingly weighed heavier on
both his political agenda and on his personal conscience. The Prime Minister, however,
also opted to retain the idea of religious liberty in Scotland for the sake of garnering the
nation’s liberal vote while maintaining an assertion that he needed to recognize the
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validity of Scottish Church dissenters and their concerns. Contrary to his previous notions
of Church and State, Gladstone readily admitted that forcibly maintaining a United
Kingdom by placing all lands under an Established Anglican Church answerable to the
government was not realistic if the Scottish and the Irish people were to remain content
as British subjects. This conviction by Gladstone is even more apparent when considering
his success in passing the Irish Church Act in 1869. Despite doubts from his own nonconformist supporters and those of his English critics over the effective change that the
bill could bring to the religious establishment in Ireland, Gladstone defied various
expectations and provided a significant representative measure to the nation that
abolished the authority of the Anglican Church over Ireland. Gladstone prioritized certain
democratic values over his own personal perspectives steeped in his Anglican principles.
That is not to say that Gladstone relinquished the importance of Anglicanism to his own
person, but rather that he sacrificed a favored ideology in order to maintain a sound
relationship with Irish and Scottish supporters, thereby affirming a principle of sincerity
regarding individual representation within Gladstonian Liberalism.
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CHAPTER III

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Gladstone’s dealings in the disestablishment of the Irish Church and his
considerations for the plight of his Free Church supporters in Scotland certainly reflect
aspects of Gladstonian Liberalism within the immediate bounds of the United Kingdom.
However, Gladstone’s administrative abilities also encompassed British concerns tied to
international policies including the tariff reforms enacted during the Crimean War, the
feud with Benjamin Disraeli over Bulgaria concerning the Eastern Question, and the
controversial nature of Gladstone’s handling of the Khartoum incident. All three of these
events portray aspects relevant to Gladstone’s liberal policies and their applications to
international affairs. Again, the purpose of the thesis is not to glorify Gladstone’s career,
but rather to highlight specific facets of the Liberal MP’s conviction regarding
representation which reveal the unique qualities of his sociopolitical practices both
nationally and abroad.
An example of international endeavors adherent to Gladstonian influence
connects to the Crimean War fought between Russia and an alliance of European powers
including Britain, France, and the Ottomans. Gladstone, although generally a pacifist, did
not always balk at the prospect of war. He subsequently prioritized British financial
subsidies allowing the nation’s budget to contribute to the defense of the Ottomans
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during the Crimean War. Interestingly, Gladstone supported the interests of a non-British
nation in protecting what he believed to be an oppressed state although he professedly
exhibited reservations over the necessity of an extended war and of relying on the
trustworthiness of the Turkish Muslims.88 Furthermore, upon Britain’s entry into the
conflict, Gladstone doubled income taxes which mandated that the British people
consider the merits of war by fronting military costs.
By this action of further taxation, Gladstone seemingly accomplished liberal
representation in two ways. First, Gladstone could support his fellow MPs as well as his
own ethics by defending Ottoman interests while limiting the ability of the Empire to
further war with Russia. Second, he prompted British citizens to accept financial
responsibility for a war that they advocated. Deliberately alluding to Gladstone’s personal
ethics, Olive Anderson states that Gladstone viewed taxation in wartime as a moral
imperative aimed at preventing the people from continuing war for the sake of imperial
patriotism alone.89 Gladstonian Liberalism seemed less concerned with nationalism and
more concerned with extending representation to oppressed people. In the fashion of true
Gladstonian Liberalism, the MP’s views shifted from loyal support of one group (the
Ottomans) to another (the Bulgarian Christians) in the turmoil of the Eastern Question,
particularly related to the Bulgarian Uprising of 1876. The rebellion, which Gladstone
referred to as the “Bulgarian horrors,” prompted the MP to openly attack Turkish
treatment of the Bulgarians as well as criticize Disraeli’s handling of the situation as head
of the Tories. Essentially, Gladstone contested that Britain’s role as a representative
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involved in Ottoman interests did not extend into the allowance of a Bulgarian
massacre.90 These reactions are evidence of Gladstonian Liberalism because they
demonstrate a merging of political and ethical considerations subjectively applied to the
urgencies at hand.
Gladstone’s choices did not always succeed in appeasing the people regardless of
his intention to promote British interests. This method of governance is particularly true
concerning his decision to appoint Major-General Charles Gordon as a British
representative to Sudan for evacuating the city of Khartoum. Gordon’s death at Khartoum
and the subsequent sacking of the Sudanese city by the self-proclaimed Mahdi threatened
the validity of Gladstone’s government in the eyes of the people. Despite his
predeterminations that Britain’s maintenance of Egypt was necessary in retaining the
benefits of the Suez Canal, Gladstone believed military expansion into Sudan did not
represent British interests.91 One can attribute pragmatic policies to Gladstone’s
international administration depending on the context. However, his rigid taxation in
wartime, active critique of Ottoman aggression on the Bulgarians, and reluctance to
pacify Sudan through military force divulge key characteristics of Gladstonian methods.
Understanding some of the reasons for Britain’s entry into the Crimean War
allows the observer to comprehend Gladstone’s role in this period as Chancellor of the
Exchequer, better highlighting why his involvement in the affair reflects elements of his
own personal style of governance. Goodlad states that by the 1850s Britain’s objectives
in the Crimean War connected to former fears that France and Russia were the most
significant rivals to imperial interests. The Ottoman Empire also provided a considerable
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boundary against potential Russian aggression and prevented Russia from disrupting
British trade interests in the Mediterranean, thereby positioning the Ottomans as the most
logical ally within the wake of potential conflict.92 Christopher Hibbert adds that Turkish
grievances with Russia, from an Ottoman point of view, accelerated when Tsar Nicholas
I learned of Orthodox monks who were slaughtered during riots between themselves and
their French-backed Roman Catholic counterparts over Bethlehem’s Church of the
Nativity. The reason that Russia included the Ottomans in the incident alludes to an
assertion by Nicholas I that the Turkish police conspired with the French to “murder” the
monks prompting the Russians to respond with hostility. Subsequently, the Ottoman
Empire and France both retaliated, leading to war with Russia in 1853.93 At this point in
Russo-Turkish tensions, Britain’s Parliamentary leaders quarreled over the prospect of
war with Russia. Initially, Conservative Prime Minister Lord Aberdeen did not seek an
immediate confrontation because he hoped to find common ground with Russia through
negotiation. Contrastingly, as the war began, the British populace was generally in favor
of combating Russian imperial expansion. However, the slow military progress against
Russia, the onset of disease on the battlefield, and unsupportive Parliamentary leaders
temporarily soured the idea of continued conflict.94 At this point, Gladstone advocated
war, dissenting with Lord Aberdeen.
Parry points to Lord Palmerston as an MP who gained significant popularity from
his approach to Britain’s policies in the aftermath of the Crimean War. The author touts
Palmerston as a patriotic and popular MP who, in the eyes of the British Whig-Liberals,
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was the only figure capable of dissuading future Russian aggression.95 Gladstone viewed
this rise to power firsthand as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Hibbert also notes that
Aberdeen doubted his own ability to deal with the Russian crisis and conceded to
Palmerston’s authority on the matter.96 Apparently, Lord Palmerston seemed ready to
curb Russian intentions toward pursuing intrigues against British interests even after the
war’s end in 1856. Palmerston, according to contemporary accounts, declared that, even
in defeat, Russia proved untrustworthy, and he suggested that the Russians still disputed
the victor of the conflict.97 However, Palmerston does not necessarily play the role of an
avid warmonger. His approach nevertheless was instrumental in producing British
supremacy. J. R. Vincent specifically states that Palmerston “was not an agitator for
war;” he supported the conflict against Russian aggression with a more calculated
political demeanor.98 Palmerston’s reluctance to pursue physical confrontation bears
similarities to Aberdeen’s position, but was infused with a patriotic flair reminiscent of
British imperialism. For both leaders, the question of war against Russia touched on
democratic issues within British society because each individual tried to gauge public
opinion with Palmerston emerging victorious as an apparent representative to a pro-war
citizenry.
Gladstone also shared responsibility with Aberdeen and Palmerston over the
reasons for and outcomes of the Crimean War from two perspectives. First, the contrast
between Aberdeen and Palmerston over the most effective tactics against Russia relates
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to Gladstone because of his fondness for Lord Aberdeen. Undoubtedly, Gladstone
idolized his former Conservative prime minister even while he proclaimed loyalty to the
Peelite movement in the 1850s. After the Conservative leader’s passing in 1860,
Gladstone remarked of Aberdeen:
History has also caught, and will hold firmly and well, the honoured name of your
father. There was no varnish upon his reputation more than upon his character. He
will be remembered in connection with the great passages of European policy not
only as a man of singularly searching large, and calm intelligence, but yet more as
the first man that used only true weights and measures, and ever held evenly the
balance of his ordered mind.99
Gladstone’s relationship with Aberdeen is essential to the overall issue of Gladstonian
policy and its relevance as a unique approach to British democracy. The reason for this
validity is that, despite Gladstone’s obvious admiration for one of his mentors who
opposed war with Russia, Gladstone still advocated for war because, from his
perspective, the decision to contest Russian aggression was the will of the people.
Interestingly, this position by Gladstone to maintain favor with British citizens conflicted
with his political goals and his ethical qualities during Gordon’s demise at Khartoum as
Gladstone reluctantly allowed the people their hero but garnered Britain’s disdain after
Gordon’s death. In other words, Gladstone’s fondness for Aberdeen was genuine and so
was his pacifist nature, at least from a personalized moral stance, although his adherence
to British needs seemingly outweighed personal emotions. John Morley asserts that his
former colleague, Gladstone, clearly did not desire war as a primary solution with Russia
but conceded that it was justified because the Russians forced British involvement by
oppressing the Ottomans. However, Morley continues that by early 1855 Gladstone
actively sought to end Britain’s involvement in the hostilities due to the willingness of
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Russia to relinquish certain objectives of expansion and the costs of war becoming
detrimental to allied forces in Europe.100 Jenkins also supports this claim by Morley and
asserts that in 1855 Gladstone’s open opposition to a continuation of war with Russia
raised political scrutiny about him.101 Nevertheless, Gladstone contested the notion
favored by Palmerston that conflict with Russia should continue. Gladstone even argued
that the Ottomans, while facing Russian aggression, likewise abused the Eastern
Christians, thereby calling the moral ground of defending Turkish interests into
question.102 For Gladstone, prolonged international violence jeopardized British society
by potentially fueling an imperialist spark amidst the British people, leaving a bleak
outlook for the overall resolution to the Eastern Question from a progressive perspective.
As stated previously, the Crimean War embodies one of the primary examples of
Gladstonian policy concerning international affairs. Although Gladstone initially
vocalized his opinion to support the people and their desire to confront Russian
aggression with the might of the British Empire, he also applied a democratic policy
through economic administration. Gladstone again held the office of Chancellor of the
Exchequer during the Crimean War and possessed direct influence over Britain’s
financial priorities, including government spending in wartime. In this position of
financial liability, Gladstone distinguished himself as a political individual determined to
act on immediate issues of foreign policy, including taxation during the Crimean War.
Interestingly, Gladstone, although initially supporting the war, placed the burden of
financial responsibility on the British citizenry rather than upon the government or on
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exterior sources. Gladstone’s reasoning stemmed from a notion that is arguably
democratic in that he believed that if the people supported war then the government must
oblige, but, in turn, the people should bear the costs out of their own pockets. Hammond
and Foot suggest that this position on war taxation disrupted Gladstone’s initial plan to
curb tariffs due to the immediate needs of war funding. Gladstone also refused to borrow
money from exterior sources as Britain did against Napoleon’s previous imperialistic
advances and against the former American colonial conflicts.103 Gladstone clearly
possessed a cautious war agenda based on his financial methods because he hoped that
taxation would prove an effective deterrent against a prolonged conflict with Russia.
Furthermore, Gladstone’s decision to tax income during wartime undoubtedly met with
opposition from political rivals who argued that the lower classes would not be able to
supply a sufficient share from their limited income.104 However, Gladstone exhibited
another democratic trait by placing the responsibility for war into the hands of the British
population, despite his own desire to see an end to continuous conflict. In summary,
Gladstone’s involvement in the Crimean War, although limited in time and authority,
allowed the MP to emerge as a notable political figure whose policies extended
recognition to the British people through, ironically, taxation.
While the following passages will discuss Gladstone’s role as a liberal-based
deterrent to Disraeli’s pro-Turkish agenda, it is also important to mention their
contrasting positions during the Crimean War because it reveals the long-term animosity
between the two British leaders, especially regarding the Eastern Question. As previously
reported, Gladstone initially advocated a pro-war stance to a degree, but he did not
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wholly support Palmerston’s agenda due to its zealous demeanor on the nature of
international conflict for the sake of maintaining British honor. Disraeli, on the other
hand, sided with Palmerston in a pro-Turkish intention which, according to Vincent,
furthered Palmerston’s desire to accent a distinction between the Peelites, of which
Gladstone was a member, and the Derbyites, the party to which Disraeli had once
professed loyalty.105 It is relevant to mention that Disraeli’s affiliation with Lord Derby
(Lord Stanley) is partially comparable to Gladstone’s following of Peel. The reason is
that while both men seemingly shared the confidence of their mentors, neither MP
conformed wholeheartedly to their respective ideas. Interestingly, like Gladstone, Disraeli
also served as Chancellor of the Exchequer (under Derby in 1852) although he did not
enjoy the continuity of trust with Derby’s successor, Aberdeen, who favored
Gladstone.106 Vincent, however, states that Disraeli eventually left the Derbyites and
implies that, like Palmerston, he did not conform to the characteristic of an avid
warmonger simply seeking glory for Britain. It is also true that Disraeli, similar to
Gladstone, considered peaceful alternatives to war with Russia despite openly supporting
the continuation of the conflict.107 In contrast, however, Hibbert dissents by indicating
that Disraeli may have avoided actual conflict with Russia, but seemed eager to meet
Russian aggression with British might should escalation prove inevitable.108 This position
of Disraeli departs from Gladstone since both men initially supported war, but Gladstone
rejected notions of continued international strife. The information laid out by Vincent,
Hammond, and Foot suggests that Disraeli and Gladstone may have shared a common
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interest to see Russia give in to allied European concessions before escalating into a
greater international calamity. Politically speaking, however, their actions suggest a
rivalry of bureaucratic interests which would inevitably manifest between the two MPs
over the nature of how best to represent British interests.
From the perspective of the British people, during the Crimean War, Gladstone
and Disraeli both exhibited merits of leadership that garnered domestic admiration. The
two MPs expressed their own budget plans during wartime with Gladstone emerging the
political victor. Gladstone proved he could meet the fiscal expectations of the British
people as well as the objectives of the government.109 While Disraeli endeavored to
prepare an income tax capable of matching any deficiencies brought on by post-war
expenditures, he was unable to compete with the economic strategies of his Peelite
counterpart. British citizens took note of Disraeli’s initial budgetary failures before the
full onset of the Crimean War since he was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. The
Liverpool Mercury openly acknowledges Gladstone’s fiscal prowess as a success,
surpassing Disraeli’s budget plans which failed to correctly calculate a balanced contrast
between expenditures and deficiencies in the early 1850s.110 Post-war journalists from the
Chester Chronicle tout Gladstone as a near-savior of Disraeli’s apparent inability to meet
the financial needs of Britain’s citizens and the writers acknowledge the clear animosity
between the two before the emergence of Bulgarian issues in the Eastern Question in the
1870s.111 Despite their varying solutions to budget reforms, Gladstone and Disraeli each
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undoubtedly endeavored to solve Britain’s financial struggles both at home and abroad.
Disraeli’s efforts should not obscure his early budgetary failures because he did return to
British politics as a beacon of conservatism after the fact. Gladstone, however, through
domestic fiscal manipulation, addressed an international concern and gained
sociopolitical recognition as an MP who could accomplish promised financial feats that
were beneficial to the British people, thereby revealing an early example of his reform
capabilities.
Nearly two decades after the results of the Crimean War, the Eastern Question
remained unanswered for MPs on both sides of the British political spectrum. The
Eastern Question in the 1870s (specifically the event seen by Gladstone as Turkish
atrocities committed on Bulgaria) verified a continuation of British imperialistic
enthusiasm over the nature of the empire’s relationship with the Ottomans. By this
period, Gladstone represented the head of the Liberal Party and the Leader of the
Opposition against Benjamin Disraeli who served as prime minister in Parliament and his
Conservative rival from 1874-80. The appointment of Disraeli should not be overlooked
since the Liberal Party carried a long-standing dominance in Parliament until Disraeli
exploited dissent between the Whig-Liberals and their radical counterparts. Gladstone’s
inability to coalesce the Liberal Party, in turn, allowed the Conservatives to emerge with
a united front by appealing to a sense of traditional nationalism fueled by new
invigoration in British society.112 Seaton-Watson contributes that, contrary to Gladstone,
Disraeli’s succession, while not a surprise, revealed an inevitable transformation from
mainstream Conservatism to a party entranced by Disraeli’s “active” approach to
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imperialist interests, including Britain’s relations with Turkey.113 Furthermore,
Gladstone’s continuous considerations for disestablishment in 1885 led Whig-Liberals to
conclude that Gladstone might not carry their best interests to the fore-front of
parliamentary procedure, thereby weakening the Liberal Party and allowing for a
Conservative takeover.114 Disraeli now enjoyed a measure of authority above that of
Gladstone and, as a result, Britain’s direction in the Eastern Question fell largely to the
Conservatives’ administrative prowess. This acquiescence to Conservative leadership in
Britain’s government challenged Gladstone’s ability to achieve progressive objectives
until his second premiership in 1880.
The massacre in Bulgaria by Turkish forces appears to have ignited the potent
feud between Gladstone and Disraeli to the detriment of the latter who seemingly did
little to quell Ottoman aggression against the Bulgarians in order to maintain the British
Empire’s pro-Turkish stance. Gladstone, through his pamphlet Bulgarian Horrors and
the Question of the East, openly berates Disraeli and his cabinet’s “unpreparedness” on
the matter, suggesting that the Conservative prime minister practically ignored the gravity
of the Bulgarians’ plight.115 Conversely, Disraeli became plagued by multiple intrigues
including several rebellions within Bosnia and Bulgaria against the Ottomans’ treatment
of resident Christians. Gladstone’s account of these affairs is important since it reveals a
key transition from his initial support of the Ottomans at the onset of the Crimean War to
an extensive critique of those whose methods he deemed barbaric. Likewise, groups that
shared Gladstone’s confidence, including non-conformist Liberals and High Churchmen,
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openly expressed their disapproval for the treatment of their oppressed eastern “brothers”
by Turkish Muslims, thereby allowing Gladstone to appear as a representative of both
British religious organizations. Gladstone also championed the “downtrodden”
Bulgarians by displaying a sense of humanitarianism, further promoting his progressive
sympathies.116 Disraeli, however, disregarded Gladstone’s position and contested his
Liberal counterparts’ account of the affair as it appeared uneducated in its assessment
Nodding to Disraeli’s assertion, Jenkins does concede that Gladstone’s pamphlet about
the Bulgarians did appear impulsive in its publication leaving little sympathy to either an
Ottoman or a Conservative response to the incident.117 British media largely paralleled
Gladstone’s position on the Bulgarian incident ineffectively dealing with the complexities
of the matter. Initial reports by The Birmingham Daily Post borrow from the Times and
pertain to a Turkish attack on a Bulgarian village alluding to the occurrence of both rape
and murder and casting a demonizing portrayal of the Ottomans.118 Several months later
the Northern Echo cites a comparison between Turkish reports claiming at least 18,000
casualties compared to the more dramatic Bulgarian account of up to 30,000 people
affected by Ottoman brutality.119 While the media may have tallied the casualty numbers
so as to gain Britain’s sympathies, popular opinion largely sided with Gladstone against
the Turkish regime, thereby enabling the Liberal MP to acquire said sympathies as a
representative of British compassion toward Bulgaria.
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Public opinion, while seemingly in favor of action against the Ottomans in the
wake of the Bulgarian uprising, did occasionally split on the matter. In opposition to
Gladstone’s assessment, the Pall Mall Gazette presents an article doubting the validity of
the casualty reports concerning the Bulgarian uprising, going so far as to suggest that
Britain withdraw from the affair completely.120 Disraeli concluded that the reports of the
Bulgarian atrocities were not substantial enough to warrant immediate retaliation against
the Ottoman Empire. Decision making was hampered by limited intelligence and by
untrusted sources leading Seaton-Watson to conclude that continued Conservative
support of the Ottomans was justified, especially as imperialist protocol demanded that
Britain remain pro-Turkish for the sake of maintaining imperial stability.121 One might
also consider Disraeli’s previous dealings in the Crimean War specifically the parameters
laid down by the Treaty of Paris in 1856. Harold Temperley highlights Article VIII
stating that any European power-seeking aggression towards Turkey must adhere to its
neighboring nations concerning the validity of such a measure. In other words, if Britain
attacked the Ottomans on a whim, the government then risked the retaliation of their
European counterparts if the aggression did not garner unanimous support.122 Plausibly,
Disraeli sought to avoid antagonizing other imperial powers, including France and
Germany, by not rashly contending with the Ottomans in spite of an apparent affront to
humanitarian ideals. Disraeli’s handling of the Bulgarian incident appears to conform
with an imperialist perspective of Britain’s role in European affairs. That is not to say that
Disraeli, to the disdain of popular opinion, favored international confrontation, but rather
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he endeavored to maintain strong international boundaries for the sake of a stable empire.
Contrastingly, Gladstone maintained his own idealism by supporting the plight of
Bulgarian Christians and by favoring action against Muslim aggression, thereby
championing a more Liberal-sided approach to Ottoman aggression. In short, Gladstone,
although not holding a position of political power at the time of the Bulgarian uprising in
comparison to Disraeli, still exhibited aspects of his own Liberalism by prioritizing the
representation of the oppressed over that of British pro-Turkish priorities.
Of the numerous international affairs affiliated with Gladstone’s Liberal policies,
the most controversial might be the incident in Sudan leading to the death of British
paragon General Charles Gordon and the related fall of Khartoum to Mohammed Ahmed.
Undoubtedly, the aftermath constituted conflicting perspectives with Gladstone
attempting to prevent British expansion into Sudan no matter the cost and with the public
viewing Gordon as a patriotic hero meeting his martyrdom at the hands of the selfproclaimed Mahdi. Issues leading to Gladstone’s decision to send a single man in place
of a full military expedition merits further discussion before addressing the siege of
Khartoum. Gladstonian policy prior to Gordon’s inclusion into the Sudanese uprising
bears pertinence, especially considering that imperial intrigue already existed with Egypt,
a nation whose “interests” Britain protected largely due to the benefits of defending the
Suez Canal. Cunningham states that a primary reason the British government maintained
a military presence in Sudan’s neighboring nation of Egypt was imperial trade objectives.
Essentially, the British Empire might control commercial passages around South Africa
via the Cape of Good Hope while simultaneously dominating naval routes throughout
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North Africa after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.123 Judd further indicates that
the benefits of the canal proved advantageous to the objectives of the British Empire
more so than to other nations.124 The importance of the canal is paramount because its
influence over Egypt provided Britain with significant commercial prowess, lessoning the
necessity to conquer the whole of the African continent or to assimilate the entirety of the
Arabian peninsula to achieve the same result. In short, control of the canal meant that
British imperial sovereignty benefited without further military expansion.
The considerable capacity of the Suez Canal’s trade potential seems
complimentary to certain Gladstonian administrative goals that included a desire to
maintain the strength of the empire without resorting to aggressive expansion. Gladstone
specifically praised the functional qualities of the canal as reported by the Western Mail.
According to its article, Gladstone viewed the Suez asset as a two-pronged solution to
imperial concerns, including a means of rapid commodity distribution to various subjects
of the empire, and perhaps more relevant to Gladstone’s personal ideas, a promising
symbol of international peace through trade.125 Additionally, Judd concludes that
Gladstone acknowledged an Egyptian interest towards its own nationalist potential
although apparently he possessed ulterior motivations including personal fiscal gains
related to “Egyptian shares”.126 Interestingly, Bebbington implies that Gladstone
professed an initial reluctance to enter Egypt and did not intend to place it under
permanent British subjugation.127 Judd counters Bebbington, however, by pointing out
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that Gladstone possessed no illusions regarding the fact that Egypt’s government was
actually British, demonstrating that the Liberal MP fully intended to label the Egyptians
as an imperial protectorate.128 These accounts by Bebbington and Judd suggest the
probability that Gladstone’s interest in the British administration over Egypt included
political and personal motivations although they were not solely imperialist in nature. In
short, the conservation of Egypt’s Suez Canal furthered the parameters of Gladstonian
policies, whereas by the early 1880s the continuation of a military presence in Sudan
yielded few attractive prospects for the goals of his government.
The previous statement does not aim to suggest that Britain’s imperial ventures
failed to grace the borders of Sudan before Gladstone’s complete removal of British
forces from the region in 1885. Pugh argues that protection of the Suez Canal
theoretically included the need to secure the Egyptian/Sudanese boundary because of its
strategic military positioning.129 Gladstone’s further involvement in Sudan arose from a
previous series of conflicts between British-led Egyptian forces and Mahdist fighters led
by Mohammed Ahmed escalating in the early 1880s. Donald Featherstone asserts that
British military endeavors in Sudan derive from affairs merged into a broader spectrum
of what one might label a Sudanese Question that lasted nearly two decades.
Furthermore, Featherstone concludes that, due to an Egyptian nationalist revolt in 1882,
Gladstone’s cabinet opted to install a British-led “Egyptian government” which extended
authority to Sudan, thereby threatening the Mahdi’s dominion.130 It would be an
understatement to suggest that Mohammed al-Mahdi succeeded in garnering a significant
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following in his Muslim cause to eliminate British-backed Egyptians from Sudan. John
Clarke, in examining the characteristic of the Mahdi, states: “As his popularity and
following increased, the British and Egyptian rulers of his country became alarmed over
the discontent he was spreading among the people and ordered his arrest”.131 In 1883
Egyptian forces led by Colonel William Hicks arrived in Sudan to challenge the Mahdi in
perhaps one of the most doomed militant ventures attributed to the British in the
nineteenth century. Full blame does not rest with Hicks for his downfall since his
expedition consisted of a majority of mostly ill-trained Egyptian conscripts travelling
through dense forest terrain combined with the soldiers’ lack of enthusiasm toward
fighting a British war over Sudan. Contrastingly, Hicks’ opponent, Mohammed Ahmed
led an army of zealous followers determined to win their jihad against imperial Britain,
resulting in a one-sided slaughter and in the death of Hicks at Shaykan.132 In the
aftermath of Hicks’ poorly fought campaign against the Mahdi, Gladstone opted for
withdrawal of the British/Egyptian military presence from Sudan in 1884 because he
correctly assumed that continuous intrigue with Egypt would only pull Britain further
into international conflict with Sudan. Gladstone’s assertion connects to an imperialist
sentiment identifiable with his Liberal sensitivities since he prioritizes the preservation of
British assets over the expansion of the empire. Effectively, Gladstone’s initial response
to the Sudanese Question poses an opposite solution compared with his approach to the
Eastern Question. In one situation, Gladstone, as the political opposition, advocated for
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immediate retaliation against Ottoman oppression while as prime minister he reluctantly
confronted Mahdist aggression in Sudan with the goal of eventually removing forces.
Pursuing this British withdrawal from Sudanese borders, Gladstone warily
appointed famed war-hero Charles Gordon to evacuate the residents of Khartoum with
the apparent expectations by Gladstone that Gordon would avoid conflict with the
Mahdi.133 Gladstone rightly asserted that sending the passionate Gordon, who had already
gained experience from previous campaigns including in the Crimean War, in China, and
relevantly in Sudan, might gain the sympathies of the patriotic British people at home,
and in turn, they would demand increased military aggression against the Mahdi.134 The
British media clearly portrayed Gordon as a Christian warrior crusading against the
Muslim forces for the sake of protecting the oppressed occupants of Khartoum. London’s
newspapers readily depicted Gordon as a “gallant” hero tirelessly preparing the city and
laying mines in readiness of the Mahdi’s advance.135 An article from the Citizen further
concludes that the troops in Khartoum became relieved at Gordon’s presence in the city,
likely owing to his former accomplishments in Sudan.136 Undoubtedly, Gordon’s
intentions proved noble; however, Gladstone did not want Gordon to continue fighting in
Khartoum and, at Gordon’s request for military aid, Gladstone denied the request despite
popular demand. In fact, Gladstone “stalled” against rising pressure from Britain to
intervene on behalf of Gordon because he did not want to sink financial assets or military
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units into a potential war that he had consistently protested. Gladstone’s judgment
regarding his hesitance to aid Gordon garnered ill-favor in the minds of Britain’s
populace, especially given that Gordon’s position was one of defense rather than
conquest. In August 1884, Prime Minister Gladstone reluctantly conceded to rescue
Gordon by sending troops led by Lord Wolseley to Khartoum.137 Wolseley arrived in
Khartoum in January 1885, two days after the fall of the city and after the death of
Gordon at the hands of Mahdi forces. Responsively, British sentiment lost little time in
blaming Gladstone for the unfortunate incident, largely citing him as the politicallyminded murderer of a British martyr.138 Historically, it is fair to conclude that Gladstone
certainly shared at least a degree of political responsibility for Gordon’s demise;
however, as stated previously, the prime minister’s administrative policy on the matter of
imperial expansion remained firmly Gladstonian in principle. At no time did Gladstone
assume a political position that the British government should take an offensive stance
with an imperialist agenda, in spite of popular demand. Instead, the Liberal MP opted to
focus on the preservation of Britain’s current holdings. In other words, Gladstone focused
on internal development rather than on imperial extension.
In conclusion, Gladstone’s political policies regarding international affairs proved
subjective to the various issues to which he concerned himself. As a young Peelite,
Gladstone readily advocated the defense of the Ottomans in the wake of Russian
aggression, yet he also contested popular opinion, stating that the Crimean War should
not continue beyond a reasonable conclusion should Russia agree to relinquish its
objectives. Furthermore, Gladstone’s position as Chancellor of the Exchequer allowed
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him to place fiscal responsibility for the Crimean War on the people, thereby assuming a
position of representation through taxation. Gladstone altered his previous pro-Ottoman
stance to an anti-Turkish standpoint during the Eastern Question in the 1870s.
Effectively, Gladstone became an avid critic of both the Ottomans’ treatment of the
Bulgarians as well as Disraeli’s administrative responses to protecting imperial interests
over that of those being oppressed. It may have been easier for Gladstone to attack
Disraeli’s government as, at the time, Gladstone did not bear the responsibilities of prime
minister as compared to his Conservative opponent who faced the burdens of imperial
maintenance. Ironically, Gladstone exhibited a similar strategy to Disraeli’s during the
Liberal MPs second premiership when opting to withdraw from Muslim aggression in
Sudan. By pulling British/Egyptian forces from the region and temporarily abandoning
the country to the Mahdi, Gladstone affirmed an anti-expansionist principle in spite of
overwhelming support for Gordon by the people. Contrastingly, Gladstone’s notion of
democracy manifests in his initial backing of British popular opinion on the Crimean
War. He also sided with the British populace by defending the Bulgarians against
Ottoman oppression in the Eastern Question. Gladstone faltered, with respect to public
opinion, during the incident at Khartoum through his opposition to remaining in Sudan.
This vacillation challenges consistency in the democratic ideals that Gladstone espoused;
however, Gladstonian Liberalism typically did not pursue democracy in a direct sense.
For example, Gladstone frequently advocated popular opinion when it paralleled his
vision of representation and reform. On the other hand, Gladstone pragmatically adjusted
his policies when British prospects were minimally affected. Ideally, Gladstone seeks to
utilize democratic tendencies through representation by government, but not at the cost of
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English isolationism. While Gladstone did not always follow the favored position of the
British people, he often pursued the course of action the he believed best represented the
international interests of Britain.
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CHAPTER IV

DOMESTIC POLICIES

While international policies incorporating Gladstonian Liberalism are
demonstrated by certain aspects of his political practices, Gladstone’s domestic
endeavors are equally relevant to the analysis of his career. Gladstone effectively
influenced national programs in Britain regarding relief of tariffs on British consumers,
extension of voting rights to the disenfranchised via the Second and Third Reform Acts,
and expansion of educational opportunities to the working class. Interestingly, several of
Gladstone’s notable accomplishments on the national level emerged in the first half of his
political career, especially during his administrative duties as Chancellor of the
Exchequer. A hallmark of his overall domestic achievements incorporated Gladstone’s
pursuit of broadened inclusion for the British people. Furthermore, Gladstone’s
bureaucratic experience as a Peelite Conservative significantly contributed to the overall
structure which defined the MP’s perception of moral governance and true representation.
The democratic aspect of Gladstonian reform within the domestic element of Britain
initiated or continued to develop the inclusion of the commoner in national political
discourse. Gladstone’s policies mark a major stride toward redefining British democracy
that continues into the present.
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The importance of and relationship between these three issues will display the
intricacies of Gladstonian politics. This interrelatedness connects several fronts into a
systematic transformation. The lessening of tariffs on goods that were required by the
lower classes revealed Gladstone’s understanding that the poor needed further protection
by its government. Hammond and Foot describe this endeavor of tax relief as “relieving
hardships for the poor”.139 Gladstone’s representative efforts to alleviate taxation on the
commoners extended into his resolution to lessen disenfranchisement. Gladstone
furthered the extension of the voting franchise for the working class through a
combination of his own reform efforts in 1866 and, as Kristen Zimmerman states, a
“radical” decision by Disraeli to pass the Second Reform Act of 1867, thereby
strengthening democratic tendencies in the British political structure.140 Secret voting,
although controversial to English sentiments and provocative to Gladstone personally,
bestowed an even greater sense of democracy for Britain because its institution allowed
minority groups, who were previously reluctant to acknowledge a chosen candidate, to
gain a broader political voice.141 Implementation of the Third Reform Act in 1884
allowed Gladstone to emerge successfully as an advocate for rural enfranchisement. The
malleability of Gladstonian Liberalism as demonstrated by the reforms in education in
1870 allowed various denominational teachings into British school systems and boosted
Gladstone’s endeavors to provide local education boards with greater autonomy rather
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than relying on a singular national curriculum.142 While Gladstone did not necessarily
support a number of these reforms on a personal level, his political backing of each of
these issues reveals a Liberal tendency of the Gladstonian method that often incorporated
a “greater good” style of governance despite apparent affronts to Gladstone’s intimate
idealism.143 All of these endeavors by Gladstone are inseparable and highlight his
distinctive form of legislation supporting increased delegation for British commoners. In
spite of the times when Gladstone’s aspirations and the practical application of
parliamentary capabilities conflicted with his ethical identity, Gladstone fostered greater
representation to British citizens.
Many Gladstonian domestic achievements emerged through the implementation
of a Liberal framework during the latter stages of his career, those accomplishments also
included various aspects of progressive representation which developed during his duties
as a Peelite. In fact, Gladstone’s personal understanding of governance shared complete
loyalty to neither party; rather, Gladstone viewed the party system as a means by which
he could achieve his own political goals. St. John describes Gladstonian Liberalism as a
unique political structure because Gladstone set himself apart from mainstream
Whiggery, maintained a considerable amount of fundamental Conservatism within his
Peelite principles, and incorporated aspects of Liberal radicalism.144 Bebbington utilizes
Gladstone’s own wording and affirms St. John’s premise regarding Gladstone’s
declarations. According to Gladstone, the structure of his politics should remain “liberal
in the sense of Peel, working out a liberal policy through the medium of the conservative
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party”.145 That statement does not imply that Gladstonian Liberalism is an incorrect term
as he certainly demonstrated various traits of progressive thinking. Politically speaking,
however, one should not assume that Gladstone’s conservative methods remained within
the exclusivity of his own idealism or that his techniques exhibited purely liberal
attributes.146 In some regards such as contention over the secret ballot, Gladstone
personally identified with debatably conservative “English” tendencies, i.e. maintaining
the honest vote, but conceded to the expectations of his fellow Liberal MPs in order to
preserve party solidarity.147 In other words, Gladstone occasionally proved reluctant to
support progressive initiatives backed by the Liberals. However, he also frequently
conceded to governmental realities for the sake of maintaining both political favor and
the support for his overall objectives which centered around increased delegation.
Gladstone also gradually embraced liberalism as a progressive movement and recognized
similarities between his own ideas and the proponents of reformist goals. Hammond and
Foot remark of Gladstone:
His association with Liberalism was inspiring and creative because his was the
influence of a man ready for large ideas, steeped in history, and sustained by the
study and understanding of the past. That was why he was able to give a character
of his own devising to Liberalism and give strength to causes that had poor
prospects when left to the play of the rivalries and stratagems of persons and
parties.148
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Conclusively, Liberalism did not define Gladstone, but rather he brought new meaning to
the party. This realization of the nature of Gladstonian government is essential when
examining his proficiency in national affairs. Gladstonian reforms on the domestic level
focused on faithfulness to a variety of classes and groups that Gladstone perceived as
underrepresented, even when such acknowledgements did not parallel the politician’s
personal ethics, i.e. the implementation of secret ballots. Gladstone’s amendments within
British Parliament critiqued previous notions of traditional governance, periodically
exceeding the MP’s personal convictions, and favored progressive reforms aimed at
broader representation of the British community.
Gladstone’s achievements in tariff reform occurred in 1853. However, the actual
skills he acquired coalesced during Gladstone’s transition from High Conservatism into
Peelite idealism. Peel initially promoted the young Conservative Gladstone successively
to the offices of Vice President of the Board of Trade and to President, positions through
which the latter could realize his administrative talents in the field of commercial
economics.149 As early as 1841, Gladstone became fascinated with the free-trade
movement whose principles generated a medium through which he could mobilize the
Board of Trade’s regulations to alleviate heavy tax burdens on Britain’s commerce. St.
John adds that Gladstone actively broke away from previous notions of Britain’s financial
state due to his initial disinterest in the economic field. Subsequently, Gladstone, from a
Peelite standpoint, hypothesized that an effective recognition of free-trade must
incorporate relief on national tariffs.150 During this same period in 1842, Peel, Gladstone,
and John Bright backed repeals of the Corn Laws that were garnering Conservative
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support owing to Tory agricultural holdings that benefited from tariff enforcement.
Cunningham indicates that the mindset of anti-Corn Law sentiment emphasized the
strengths of free trade as representative of middle-class manufacturers.151 Morley adds
that Gladstone embraced the intricacies of the British commercial system and adhered to
the complaints of various parties such as the “coal whippers” and “frame-work knitters”
who were concerned that their respective tariff regulations did not compare equally.152
Although much of Gladstone’s fiscal plan did not take effect until his budget reforms in
1853, the Peelite MP already demonstrated adaptable politics centered on greater
recognition of British trade interests and its relationship with the domestic economy of
the United Kingdom.
Benjamin Disraeli’s prior failed attempts at budget reform in 1852 may have
provided the spark that allowed Gladstone’s skills as a financial administrator to merit
political favor among his fellow MPs. As indicated previously, Disraeli was appointed
Chancellor of the Exchequer before Gladstone and proposed his own fiscal reforms by
appealing to a series of policies appealing to both Conservative and Liberal sentiments.
Both men perceived the financial branch of government as a potential medium for
effective representation for Britain:
A stable democracy embodies the successful representation in political terms of the
relationships of social and economic groups, whether their members be
enfranchised or not. These relationships are two-fold, between the various groups
and the State. Both Gladstone and Disraeli saw government finance, and especially
the great drama of the budget, the annually renewed social contract of the Victorian
State, as the context in which those relationships could be both fiscally and
politically expressed.153

151

Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy, 45.
Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, vol 1, 256.
153
H. C. G. Matthew, "Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Politics of Mid-Victorian Budgets," The Historical
Journal 22, no. 03 (September 1979): 616, accessed November 1, 2017, JSTOR.
152

70

In consideration of Matthew’s comment, it is also apparent that Gladstone was genuinely
willing to represent even the disenfranchised, inferring that his interests were not solely
linked to garnering more votes. As a result of the Corn law repeal, Disraeli recognized
that the previous Conservative proponents of secure agricultural representation no longer
possessed the same support by voters. Therefore, Disraeli seemingly sought to appease
the radical voters by increasing property tax and decreasing the tariffs on labor in 1852
which naturally raised Gladstone’s disapproval. St. John includes this information
however, he also adds that Gladstone considered Disraeli’s proposal disreputable and
desperate with little accountability left for further expenditures.154 Jenkins also supports
Gladstone’s appraisal that Disraeli’s motivations for the budget seemed less affiliated
with a true propensity for representative reform and more akin to a political
“smokescreen”.155 Subsequently, Parliament rejected Disraeli’s budget and in 1853
Gladstone replaced him as Chancellor of the Exchequer. One should interject a key point
by St. John that historians, including Agatha Ramm and David Bebbington, attribute
Disraeli’s failures to Gladstone’s oratory abilities in which the latter attacked Disraeli’s
budget recommendations. However, St. John provides a differing opinion stating that by
this point in Victorian politics, Disraeli’s budget was neglecting key aspects of Radical
and Liberal expectations and, considering that Conservative strength was dubious at best
owing to their reliance on vacillating Peelite support, the death of the budget was
inevitable.156 The inability of the Conservative government to harness support from both
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sides of the political spectrum seemingly fueled Gladstone’s proposal of an alternative
solution to budget reform which proved agreeable to a greater number of constituents.
After his appointment to Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gladstone proposed a
budget promoting what Bebbington labels as the MP’s “single greatest achievement”.
Essentially this financial reform reflected Gladstone’s comprehension that the current
establishment of tariffs amounted to unequal taxation of the working classes and that
equity must manifest in Britain’s fiscal policies. Gladstone then decreased tariffs on
customs meaning that commodity prices became less burdensome to consumers.157
Furthermore, the Chancellor actively addressed income tax levies by installing a gradual
decrease of over a period of seven years. Property taxation became another target of
Gladstone’s fiscal policies, thereby initiating a greater balance between property and
income payments.158 By enacting these budget policies, Gladstone effectively alienated
the Whig aristocracy, but gained the admiration of the working class. British media
outlets also touted Gladstone as an admirable figure sporting an intelligent solution to
Britain’s economic challenges.159 Two elements of Gladstonian idealism emerged
through the Budget of 1853 as Gladstone contested Whiggish benefits in favor of fairer
taxation for the common man and, despite the interruption of the financial demands of the
Crimean War, Gladstone introduced a new form of economic representation previously
unattainable by Parliament.160 Conclusively, Gladstone’s full budget potential,
interrupted by war expenditures, did not peak until 1860 after his fiscal proposals had
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already undergone several alterations yet maintaining the need to phase out income tax
while extending further tax levies on landed property owners.161 The extensive scrutiny
of and adjustment to his own budget reform supplements one of Gladstone’s primary
methods of financial reform in the mid-Victorian era. Obviously, the fiscal
accomplishments of a pre-Liberal Gladstone demonstrated some levels of imperfection
and political intrigue. However, it is also clear that his achievements as Chancellor of the
Exchequer paved a means by which Gladstone broadened the definition of British
representation. This facet of Gladstonian economic reform indicates the Chancellor’s
insertion of democratic renovations into British policy, albeit through a Victorian
perspective. That is to say that Gladstonian reform mirrored aspects of the British
comprehension of democracy which was gradually evolving toward a modern context.
The extension of the voting franchise presented another opportunity for Gladstone
to demonstrate a propensity for broader representative measures aimed at the working
class of Britain. Through financial administrative reforms, Gladstone garnered new-found
loyalty from British laborers, although his economic authority as Chancellor did not
extend over voting rights. This caveat is important to Gladstone’s involvement in
enfranchisement because he was limited in his ability to legislate effective change. His
gradual shift toward Liberal affiliation via the support of Lord Russell provided the
vehicle through which the MP pursued another aspect of parliamentary representation
that in time assumed the title of Gladstonian Liberalism. That is not to say that
Gladstone’s and Russell’s decision to expand the franchise served as the defining virtue
of Gladstonian Liberalism; however, this attempt, along with a respective nod to
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Gladstone’s reluctant adoption of secret voting, certainly echoes a propensity for the
MPs’ contributions to the Liberal cause. In fact, Britain recognized that Gladstone’s
support of franchise extension demonstrated his proclivity for democratic change via
Liberal policy, although disagreement exists within the media regarding the nature of
democracy as it pertains to the established national customs at the time. For example, an
article from the Aberdeen Journal acknowledges Gladstone’s parameters for
enfranchisement that limit the voting rights to those who could pay for the privilege. This
same article also criticizes the supposedly misinformed Times for insisting that
Gladstone’s democratic allowances were unchecked because he was allowing a majority
of citizens to vote regardless of any qualifications.162 One should acknowledge that, in
the Victorian Era, the term “democracy” did not yield an absolute definition within
British society. Cunningham emphasizes that democracy as a broader idea often
challenged mainstream imperial policy and reflected the expectations of the
disenfranchised.163 This assertion by Cunningham is relevant to Gladstone’s support of
expanding the franchise because the MP, in this regard, breaks away from the empire’s
societal priorities by politically backing greater representation for the working class.
It was not Gladstone but Disraeli who produced the bill in 1867 which greatly
expanded voting rights to males within the United Kingdom. Gladstone, along with
Russell and Bright, proposed extensions to enfranchisement in 1866 although they did
not survive the scrutiny by fellow MPs to pass a law which led to the resignation of
Russell’s cabinet.164 One may assume from the preceding statements that Disraeli rather
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than Gladstone demonstrated the greater sense of broadening representation within the
empire. However, at least two components differentiate the positions of the two MPs
regarding voting revisions. Gladstone’s propensity for reform proved selective in a
manner identifiable with his own assertion that only a paying voter from the working
class should merit the right to engage in a British democratic process. Interestingly, this
deliberate classification of the qualified voter by Gladstone attached “moral” traits to the
method. Stephen Lee states that, by the 1860s, Gladstone asserted that the upper portion
of the working class matured into a responsible community capable of forming an
intelligent constituency. Moreover, by incorporating said group into the voting franchise,
Gladstone hoped to prevent a rise in socialistic tendencies, citing capitalism as the viable
alternative.165 Richard Cook adds that Disraeli immediately attacked Gladstone’s
proposition by implying that the act demonstrated a reliance on American ideas, thereby
playing on the concerns of British sentiment about the detriments of democracy.166
Gladstone, however, did not aim out of personal disdain to alienate lower class
individuals, but ostensibly repeated a similar position instituted during his taxation
strategies with the Crimean War. He thought that British citizens who exhibited financial
responsibility should be the constituents having a voice in the government. Disraeli, on
the other hand, sought to garner the support of working class citizens beyond the
exclusivity offered to the “paying voter,” thereby increasing enfranchisement to a greater
number of male homeowners. Bebbington indicates that Disraeli’s 1867 Reform Bill
borrowed heavily from an idea that was fundamentally Gladstonian and expanded on it
by exhibiting traits obviously more radical than Gladstone’s viewpoint and arguably
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more anti-Conservative in its structure, thereby attracting a measure of Liberal
reinforcement.167 Parry also agrees that a genuine appreciation for the working class
existed in Gladstone and his Liberal supporters, possibly owing some progression of
democratic reform in Victorian Britain to his endeavors.168 Robert Johnson adds that by
adopting the position held by Liberal MPs who wished to see greater enfranchisement,
where Gladstone was unsuccessful, Disraeli managed to pass a bill through gaining
support from his own loyal Conservative colleagues and from a number of Liberals.169 In
contrast to Bebbington’s and Johnson’s assertion that Disraeli’s bureaucratic
manipulation provided the dominant factor, St. John appears a bit more critical of
Gladstone’s failure to prevent the Liberals from siding with his Conservative opponent
over the 1867 Reform Bill. St. John attributes a degree of Gladstone’s inability to
maintain his party’s support to his harsh demeanor and his “inexperience as Leader of the
Commons”.170 Furthermore, since the death of Palmerston in 1865, the Liberal Party did
not enjoy a unified front containing a significant section of Whigs who were showing
Toryish sentiments.171 However, in any case, principles originating in Gladstonian
Liberalism were incorporated in a democratic feature of Disraeli’s voting reform bill.
Disraeli merits the credit for passing a successful bill extending the franchise to working
class males. However, expanding voting rights to fiscally responsible constituents and
furthering democratic progression is inherent to Gladstonian Liberalism rather than that
of a conservatism.
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Undoubtedly, the Liberal adoption of the secret ballot remains one of the most
controversial features of Gladstonian reforms relating to the voting franchise. Unlike the
extension of suffrage rights to the British working class, which aimed to increase the
voting population while retaining reliance on open opinion, secret ballots ideally limited
intimidation and bribery attributed to general elections.172 Kinzer writes that Gladstone’s
predecessors, including Peel and Russell, expressed concern that the secret ballot would
push democratic progression beyond comfortable limits and would undermine English
sentiments of honorable governance.173 St. John states that Gladstone openly disliked the
idea of secret voting because he surmised that it removed the element of honesty from the
political system. Essentially, Gladstone believed that voting rights should be extended but
not by incorporating any deceptive methods. This personal disdain for secret voting,
however, did not prevent him from politically supporting the act since he believed that
doing so promoted greater unity within his party.174 Another reason that Gladstone
decided to vote in favor of the secret ballot possibly links to the Irish Question. Firstly, by
enacting the Irish Church Act of 1869, Gladstone already demonstrated that he was
willing to compromise his personal ideologies to appease his supporters. During
Gladstone’s first premiership in 1868 he stated that one of his main goals would
constitute the pacification of Ireland.175 During the emergence of the Ballot Act of 1872,
British politicians noted an interest by supporters of Irish Home Rule, and Michael Hurst
suggests that the secret ballot strengthened the influence of the Irish seeking greater
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independence from political intimidation.176 In the wake of the potential benefits that
secret voting bestowed on Irish constituents, Gladstone recognized that supporting the
Ballot Act allowed him yet another medium through which he garnered Irish support. The
decision by Gladstone to pass the act allowing secret voting demonstrates representative
prowess on two fronts. Primarily, Gladstone desired to maintain a united Liberal Party
which he perceived to be the vehicle of his own reform goals. Promotion of secret voting
rights also provided Gladstone with a possible, though not guaranteed, Irish backing
similar to the motivations surrounding his disestablishment endeavors. Although some
may assert that secret balloting is essential to democracy, Gladstone reluctantly endorsed
the process though he did not connect secret voting with democratic reforms. By backing
the secret ballot, Gladstone preserved the fundamentals of Gladstonian Liberalism by
warily expanding the voting franchise.
Secret voting and enfranchisement both provided facets through which Gladstone
could realize representative aspects of Liberal progression. However, Gladstone’s efforts
in expanding the franchise did not cease with the Second Reform Act. During his second
premiership in 1883, Gladstone proposed another franchise bill in Parliament, leading to
its adoption in the subsequent year. Parry asserts that this Third Reform Act carried at
least two major alterations to previous voting parameters administered by the Second
Reform Act, including the expansion of household suffrage to numerous boroughs and an
increase in the amount of eligible constituents by over three million.177 Hammond and
Foot surmise that the new electorate was actually closer to an increase of two million;
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however, in either case, Gladstone succeeded in broadening the voting franchise to
considerable proportions.178 Furthermore, the period in which Gladstone enacted the bill
proved complimentary to its emergence as Mary Chadwick indicates that the
redistribution of electoral seats dominated parliamentary intrigue and became the “most
profound” inclusion of the three major British reform acts.179 Contrastingly, Chadwick
states that Tory opinions regarding the bill critiqued Gladstone and the Liberals,
promoting a measure that only served as a diversion from other important issues.
However, the Liberals, including Gladstone, maintained that a key theme of their party
was in fact the struggle for reform, thereby confirming that the redistribution of seats
identified with progressive priorities.180 Of the various accomplishments in Gladstonian
enfranchisement, it is likely that the Third Reform Act represents the most significant
achievement for Gladstone in furthering progressive goals linked with British democracy.
During Gladstone’s first premiership, education was a considerable and joint
concern among parliamentary debaters. The working class, now enfranchised, exerted
influence in parliamentary priorities. The direction of the commoners’ education began to
dictate British governmental proceedings because MPs were reliant on appeasing a new
population of voters. Furthermore, the addition of working class voters also challenged
the stability of voluntary schools which were supported financially by the Church of
England.181 Initially, the middle class education in Victorian Britain at best proved
limited, and it certainly did not reflect the measure of calculated curriculum accorded to
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the elite in society.182 St. John points out that the student bodies only accounted for
roughly a third of the overall British population in need of schooling, thereby presenting
the need for a national organization that could accommodate all who qualified.183 Writing
during this period of discussion, Rowland Hamilton observed that the lack of schools had
plagued Britain from the early nineteenth century, meaning that the addition of working
class students in 1867 produced a greater sense of urgency regarding educational
reform.184 Gladstone now faced challenges to the relationship between religion and
education, but he also recognized a necessity to extend the representation which he
advocated in voting rights to that of a national education system. Gladstone’s solution to
the gravity of education reform integrated locally selected school councils with expanded
educational facilities to effectively and quickly meet the increasing population of
working class students. In short, the passage of the 1870 Elementary Education Act
apportioned British schools so that fewer limitations impeded the ability of the working
class to receive a higher quality curriculum.
The establishment of expanded facilities for working class students was an
alternative to existing voluntary schools and provided a broader field for educational
institutions. However, the issue of religious based teaching still posed a significant
concern to Gladstone, especially considering his loyalty to the Anglican Church. On the
other hand, Gladstone’s education advisor, W. E. Forster, determined that the
implementation of non-denominational teaching afforded the better method of school
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curriculum.185 This stance put pressure on Anglican oriented academic instruction.
Gladstone’s Non-Conformist supporters also sought to decrease the authority of the
Anglican Church in matters of education. Therefore, Gladstone needed to appease Liberal
radicals while maintaining his portion of the Conservative vote if he hoped to produce a
valid basis for reform.186 Jenkins indicates that Gladstone actually contested the NonConformists by retaining the authority of the Anglican Church. This, in turn, led to a
significant loss in the support he had received from the radical Liberals before 1874.187
Bebbington clarifies that Gladstone disagreed with the Non-Conformists, yet he
acquiesced to the majority opinion of his party, a tactic that he would similarly employ in
the secret ballot issue nearly two years later.188 By twice acclimating to the will of his
colleagues in education and in the secret ballot, Gladstone demonstrated a political
shrewdness indicative of one striving to maintain a united party. Gladstone also
relinquished his stance on Anglican dominance as he had done with Irish
disestablishment, prioritizing the representation of the working class over his idealistic
measures. Both stances of compromise indicate that “selective working-class democracy”
and harmony with his chosen party emulated preferences by Gladstone indispensable to
the facilitation of Gladstonian Liberalism.
While Gladstone’s education reforms included a plethora of alterations to British
learning institutions, his efforts did not cease at the boundaries of England. Ireland also
faced concerns regarding the direction of denominational teachings in schools. The
question of religious inclusions in Irish schools became more apparent after Gladstone’s
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decision to concede to a non-denominational addition to English schools, despite his
misgivings of lessening the dominant Anglican structure. Additionally, while the Irish
Church Act of 1869 relinquished Anglican religious dominance, the same parameters did
not bind the Irish State’s education systems to abolish Anglican-led higher education.189
Interestingly, Trinity College in Dublin began to incorporate non-denominationalism as a
challenge to Gladstone since they assumed that he would attempt to maintain a strict
Anglican presence in Irish schools. The Tories, in turn, recognized that the installation of
a secular system in Trinity only aggravated the uneasiness between Catholics, Liberals,
and Conservatives, all of whom had invested interests in the direction of Irish
education.190 In fact, Parry suggests that even before Gladstone’s focus on Ireland, MPs
that disagreed with the non-denominational aspects of his Elementary Education Act
would set a misguided foundation for Irish reform.191 Three years after his passage of the
Elementary Education Act in 1880, Gladstone proposed that Ireland should also embrace
a similar bill allowing for higher education to conform to a non-denominational
curriculum devoid of any topics covering “theology, philosophy, and modern history”.
This decision by Gladstone harmed his reputation and his efforts to reform education in
Ireland, partially accounting for the resignation of his first premiership.192 Gladstone’s
failure to unite Parliament on the matter of Irish education reveals an oversight on his
assessment of the relationship between Ireland’s religious loyalties and their schooling.
Contrastingly, Gladstone seemingly sought to appease all the parties concerned with the
direction of Irish educational reform in the hopes of acquiring broader political favor and
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ensuring a stable education system in Britain altogether. Conclusively, Gladstone’s
curricular endeavors in Ireland failed although he still maintained a position that
adherence to domestic education should be an issue of a United Kingdom rather than a
solely English concern.
The domestic talents of Gladstone are undoubtedly numerous, and this chapter
highlights key aspects of his national achievements. For example, much of the previous
discussion centers around national concerns occurring during the first half of his political
career. One could have easily included Gladstone’s addressing of the Irish Question as a
primary example of his liberalism and reforms. However, Gladstone’s solution to the
Irish concerns merits deeper examination and will therefore be discussed below. Issues
immediately addressed in the current chapter aim to reflect specific traits of Gladstonian
Liberalism, including his venture to ease the fiscal burdens of British laborers, his resolve
to expand greater delegation to the working class, and his willingness to compromise
personal goals for the Liberal agenda. Budgetary reforms in 1853 and 1860 both targeted
tariffs between the working class and the British elite. Although the Crimean War
interrupted Gladstone’s tax alterations, he managed to decrease tariffs by an impressive
amount which nearly eliminated the process altogether. Gladstone’s success in tax reform
proved the young Peelite’s eagerness to support British laborers through financial
relaxation while maintaining a stable national economy. Despite an initial failure to
expand the voting franchise, Gladstone’s particular enfranchisement goals garnered
recognition from both sides of Parliament and, ironically his ideas endured the Second
Reform Act under implementation by political rivals. Subsequently, Gladstone
administered the adoption of the secret ballot in spite of his personal apprehensions
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regarding deceptive voting tactics. Political motivations undoubtedly laced Gladstone’s
eventual support of the secret ballot as he conceded to a notion contrary to his opinion in
favor of governmental unity and national stability. Additionally, Gladstone was able to
realize the Liberal goal of progressive reform by passing the Third Reform Act, which,
despite attracting Conservative opposition, succeeded in redefining enfranchisement with
a more democratic framework. Gladstone also accommodated sentiments outside of his
own convictions concerning his education reforms. Gladstone successfully increased the
amount of educational facilities available to working class students while capitulating to
the positions of Forster and Non-Conformist supporters by incorporating nondenominational infrastructures. Although he retained various aspects of conservative and
Anglican idealism, Gladstone integrated his own beliefs with a growing liberal movement
that, in turn, provided him with several opportunities to increase representation of the
British working class. Finally, Gladstone’s deficiencies in Irish education indicate, at the
very least, that he considered reform issues extended to the United Kingdom centering
solely on English needs. Gladstone’s employment of these aspects of domestic
representation reveal Gladstonian Liberalism as a sociopolitical mechanism reflecting a
relationship between the man’s devotion to his own beliefs and his adherence to radical
revision on a national level.
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CHAPTER V

HOME RULE

The greatest strain on the link between representative changes and traditional
practices of the British Empire occurs in the Irish Question particularly regarding the
issue of Home Rule. Britain’s tumultuous relationship with Ireland during the Victorian
era presented Gladstone with an ambitious task that potentially risked the already
threatened unity of the Liberal Party and proved challenging to his political obligations as
Prime Minister. Undoubtedly, the Irish Question yielded no simple solutions that could
appease either of the involved parties, whether they identified with England’s imperial
sovereignty or whether they supported Ireland’s nationalist cause for independent
governance. Gladstone’s decision to bring greater representation to the Irish people did
not reflect static traits for his administration. Over the course of his four premierships, the
Irish Question became definitive to Gladstone’s progressive agenda, culminating in his
greatest representative pursuit of Home Rule for Ireland. Initially Gladstone’s solution to
Irish unrest was focused on pacifying the nation through religious amendments, land
reform, and educational improvement. Gladstone continued that strategy to relieve
Ireland’s plight in two regards during his second premiership: through initializing his
Coercion Act and through a second Land Act. By the mid-1880s, however, Gladstone’s
position evolved toward a realization that his agenda should expand to incorporate greater
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freedoms for Ireland if Britain was to retain a truly United Kingdom. In both of his last
two premierships, Gladstone gradually embraced Irish Home Rule as a personal crusade
dedicated to establishing a progressive collaboration between England and Ireland. The
long-term struggle to accommodate Irish interests within the British Empire validates the
most significant example of Gladstone’s unique approach to Liberalism as a progressive
medium because he successfully strengthened his personal political standing by uniting
the Liberal Party, gaining the Irish vote, and supporting Irish representation.
While the Home Rule movement did not officially begin until 1870 under Isaac
Butt, Ireland clearly held a deeply rooted animosity toward British sovereignty that
intensified in 1800 when the passage of the Act of Union placed the Irish under English
subjugation. Essentially, the implication of “Union” was a deceptive concept since
England clearly dominated national relationships, preventing Ireland from developing a
sense of independent decision-making within the Empire.193 By the onset of Gladstone’s
first premiership, the Irish Question was unresolved and Gladstone, along with others in
the Liberal Party, sought a passible legislative approach that could maintain a peaceable
stance between England and Ireland. Incidentally, Cunningham states that Ireland’s
concerns and unrest proved to be the deciding factor that allowed the Liberals to gain
power in Parliament over Conservatives in 1868.194 Parry places an ascension of Liberal
interest for Ireland prior to Gladstone’s first premiership, stating that in 1834 the Liberal
consensus centered on the recognition that Ireland needed further recognition by the
British government.195 These truths by Parry and Cunningham reveal that, of the two
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major political parties in Britain, the Liberal Party seemingly provided the best vehicle
through which a reformer such as Gladstone could address Ireland’s complicated
situation.
Gladstone’s first attempts to respond to the Irish Question came in the form of
pacification rather than liberation through the disestablishment of the Irish Church in
1869. While this topic of disestablishmentarianism has been discussed in the first chapter,
the 1869 Church Act also defines Gladstone’s dealings with the overall Irish Question
because his decision to represent Irish Catholics partially alleviated Ireland’s tensions
with the Anglican community and increased Irish favor for the Liberal Party.196 In other
words, while the religious struggles between Catholics, Presbyterians, and Anglicans did
not cease with disestablishment, Gladstone managed to create a foothold of trust between
Irish voters and the Liberal Party, although he did not specifically consider Irish
independence a feasible solution at the time. O’Day further links disestablishment of the
Church with the Irish Question by asserting that Gladstone’s Church Act functioned as a
response to the escalation of Fenian hostilities toward Britain in 1867. The author implies
that the disestablishment process inspired greater nationalist sentiment within Ireland
while elevating the status of Liberals as the Party genuinely concerned itself with Irish
affairs. Furthermore, Gladstone’s legislation with regard to the Church of Ireland,
combined with a growing “sympathy” for the Fenian cause. gave rise to the Irish
Amnesty and Home Government Associations with future Home Rule leader Isaac Butt
at the head.197 This persuasive analysis by O’Day supports the likelihood that Gladstone,
as early as 1869, inadvertently contributed the spark that evolved into the movement for
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Irish Home Rule despite the fact that he would not openly support the premise until the
1880s. Gladstone’s disestablishment achievement obviously did not answer the Irish
Question despite the significance of relinquishing the Church’s Anglican authority over
the Irish Catholics and Presbyterians. However, disestablishment allowed Gladstone to
gain a political foothold as a representative of Irish needs. It also marked a turning point
for the Liberal Party’s movement in the direction of supporting Irish Home Rule which
would eventually be championed by Gladstone.
The act of disestablishing the Irish Church was not the only attempt by Gladstone
to pacify Ireland during his first premiership. In 1870 Gladstone fronted a Land Act
aimed at allowing Irish peasants a means by which to maintain fair rent prices and to
compensate evicted tenants.198 Essentially this Land Act represented, according to Cook,
the second of a three-pronged approach by Gladstone to further his goals for Ireland’s
pacification with disestablishment serving as the first measure in 1869 and education
reform encompassing the third in 1863.199 Because the parameters of the bill did not truly
improve the plight of peasant farmers, Biagini suggests that this land measure was merely
“half-hearted” by Gladstone.200 While Biagini’s perspective is certainly valid, he fails to
acknowledge that the main target of this particular land act was not necessarily the
betterment of the Irish farmer’s lot. In fact, Gladstone’s approach regarding landowners
seems conservative in nature because he exhibited no desire to alter the hierarchy of
Ireland’s agricultural structure.201 The significance of the 1870 Land Act relates to
Gladstone’s outlook on the Fenian uprising as was part of the case concerning
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disestablishment and he sought a valid means by which to prevent further aggression.
Gladstone linked the Fenian aggression with his land act by providing opportunities for
evicted tenants and freed prisoners to gain compensation for their financial losses. By
these parameters in the land bill, Gladstone apparently hoped that the Fenian movement
would dissipate.202 In other words, Gladstone’s method ideally strove for Irish
pacification through representation of peasant farmers and evicted tenants, allowing them
to have greater involvement in their agricultural assets while simultaneously providing an
alternative to Fenian hostilities. While the 1870 Land Act did not succeed in transforming
Ireland’s societal position toward Britain, Gladstone conceivably created a step toward
recognition for Irish commoners as well as a realization that the Irish Question would
need greater support from the Liberals if Ireland was to be pacified.
Despite the obvious failures of this attempt at land reform Gladstone continued in
his mission of representation for Ireland by passing the 1873 Universities Bill. This issue
merited discussion previously because of its connection to Gladstone’s broadened
endeavors regarding reform of British education policies. The Universities Bill also
substantiated a three-step process to allay Irish tensions by bringing its citizens better
representation.203 Rather than attempting to manage a complete overhaul of the Irish
school system, Gladstone asserted that alterations to Ireland’s university policies would
allow for unity between various denominations, including schools run by Catholics,
Anglicans, or Presbyterians. However, rather than appeasing the religious groups through
a harmonized non-denominational curriculum, Gladstone’s policy alienated his
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supporters to a degree that forced him out of his first premiership.204 As in the case of the
first Land Act, the alteration of Ireland’s educational framework did not succeed in its
ambitions regarding Irish conciliation. Therefore, Gladstone’s initial attempt at solving
the Irish Question proved a futile, undertaking. Undoubtedly, one can conclude that Irish
independence was far from Gladstone’s mind during his first premiership. However, his
struggle for Ireland’s pacification, albeit flawed, established a foundation upon which
Gladstone demonstrated his liberal policies to progressively adjust governmental policies
concerning Irish representation.
In his second premiership, Gladstone demonstrated further attentiveness toward
endeavors for Irish needs although this paled in comparison to the latter half of his career
in which he championed Home Rule. O’Day implies that when Gladstone took office in
1880 he did not bring a distinct Irish agenda to the forefront of his administration,
although he concedes that Gladstone was still resolved to meet the needs of the Irish
people.205 Cook states that in 1881 Gladstone’s cabinet focused almost exclusively on
“Irish affairs” and at least two undertakings concerning the Irish Question manifested:
coercion and land reform.206 It may be true that during his second premiership Gladstone
hesitated to leap fervently into the policies dedicated to Ireland’s reforms due to the
complicated position of maintaining parliamentary favor. However, Irish discontent still
plagued imperial interests, and the Home Rule Party began to view Gladstonian
Liberalism as an ideal vehicle through which to garner representation.207 These two facets
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of the Irish Question seemingly motivated Gladstone to continue parliamentary priorities
regarding improvements to the nation’s instability.
As the second premiership commenced, Gladstone and his Irish Secretary, W. E.
Forster, wanted to focus on land legislation as a first step toward the reexamination of
Irish reforms. However, Gladstone concluded that the failure of earlier coercion attempts
combined with a rise in discord between the England and Ireland over an increase in
tenant evictions prompted a necessity for a measure that would maintain order, so that a
viable land act could emerge.208 Interestingly, Hammond and Foot imply that Gladstone
exhibited reluctance to initiate this 1881 Coercion Act because it marred his liberal
sensibilities and he knew it challenged his goals toward greater Irish rights.209
Effectively, coercion allowed authorities to imprison suspects without cause, a policy
which in turn, angered most Irish MPs. A number of newspapers outside of Ireland
praised the Coercion Act because it challenged Irish nationalists who were led by Charles
Parnell and confirmed that at least some sources in Britain agreed that coercion would
work to pacify Irish discontent.210 On the other hand, newspapers from Ireland cite a clear
position by Home Rulers that coercion only solidified their argument that England still
unfairly ruled the Irish, and the passage of the act, if it did anything, strengthened
Parnell’s resolve to resist.211 In either case, one can label the 1881 Coercion Act as a
measure which led toward greater Irish representation because from Gladstone’s
perspective, through coercion, pacification provided him with further assurances that
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Parliament would now adhere to future reforms.212 Undoubtedly, the concept of coercion
does not advocate representation in a direct sense. However, Gladstone viewed
pacification as a stepping stone upon which Ireland and England might come to terms and
thereby actually prompt greater considerations for Irish rights which, unbeknownst to
him, eventually took the form of Gladstonian-backed Home Rule.
After passage of the Coercion Act in 1881, Gladstone moved to facilitate his
second Land Act supporting reform through the “Three Fs, Fair rent, Fixity of Tenure,
and Free Sale (of tenant right).” Essentially, this act limited the ability of landlords to
unfairly manipulate rents and promoted probabilities that tenants would be able to afford
proprietorship, ideally creating a more balanced relationship between those two involved
parties.213 Gladstone understood that this new land act was not a permanent solution to
Ireland’s economic problems and stated (somewhat humorously) that, at best, the bill
provided “three little fs”.214 However, Gladstone still conceded that, because of the Act,
the tenants and the leasers now shared dual ownership, thereby solidifying a measure of
representation previously unavailable to Irish commoners. Incidentally, Gladstone
possessed a secondary objective for the land act that was connected to his original goal of
pacification. Coercion, on its own, could never pacify the Irish nationalists who, as
previously mentioned, saw that method as another example of imperial intimidation.
Gladstone, however, believed that the installation of fairer land reforms might balance the
harshness of the Coercion Act that had agitated patriotic Land Leaguers led by Michael
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Davitt.215 Furthermore, Parnell and the Irish Nationalists began to ally with Gladstone’s
Irish Secretary and although Liberals had previously failed to pass a tenant-favored
measure in the form of the Compensation for Disturbances Act, Parnell indicated that
Irish nationalists would be willing to coalesce with Gladstone.216 Matthew argues that the
1881 Land Act was successful in both representing the Irish tenants and defeating the
opposition set by the Land League, resulting in a double triumph for Gladstone although
it still did not solve the Irish Question, nor did it pacify Ireland.217 Gladstone failed to
achieve the goal of his first two premierships, but he still managed to maintain his unique
political qualities by pursuing various solutions that would set a foundation for his later
work in the Home Rule movement. The prime minister’s land reforms, though probably
insignificant in an imperial sense, proved to Irish subjects that Gladstone was, at the very
least, concerned with their struggles, and in turn, his progressive efforts brought greater
representation for Ireland which otherwise may not have manifested under Liberal
management.
Before discussing Gladstone’s personal affiliations with Irish Home Rule, one
should note the progress of the movement prior to Gladstonian involvement. By 1880
Irish nationalists including Parnell and William Shaw initially displayed disappointment
and dissatisfaction with Gladstone’s original solutions. Coercion and land reform likely
did not promote the general welfare of Irish dissenters. However, Biagini suggests that
after Gladstone’s campaign at Midlothian, Home Rule supporters viewed Gladstonian
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Liberalism as a potential means by which to gain greater political recognition.218 O’Day
adds that in 1881 Gladstone, experienced an epiphany which altered his approach to a
solution to the Irish Question suggesting that Home Rule now posed a viable alternative
to pacification.219 Furthermore, Parnell, who had been recently released from
imprisonment, began to work reluctantly with Gladstone against Joseph Chamberlain’s
Unionist agenda which desired to “avoid full Home Rule”.220 Perhaps most relevant to
the relationship between Gladstone and Irish constituents, was the passage of the 1884
Reform Act which extended the voting franchise to households in Ireland like it had to
those in in England. In short, the Liberals now began to court a new Irish voting group
that could shift the balance of Parliament in favor of their party.221 Pugh adds that by
1885 the Home Rule supporters gained a majority of the Irish seats in the House of
Commons, thereby allowing them to greatly influence the direction that parliamentary
leaders would lean. Combining this expansion of political affiliation with the fact that
Gladstone had already exhausted his options to pacify Ireland via other programs, there
remained only one logical conclusion to Irish appeasement: Gladstone needed to avidly
support the groundswell for Home Rule.222 Acknowledging the inevitable outcry for
British recognition of Irish nationalism provided Gladstone with new opportunities for
his administration because he could further his goals of greater representation while
maintaining political favor with new constituents. In retrospect, Home Rule seemed an
imminent issue that Gladstone could either ignore or embrace. Due to the controversial
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nature of debating Irish rights in a British Parliament, Gladstone could have opted to
maintain a position of neutrality thereby erring on the side of bureaucratic caution. By
choosing the latter option of championing the cause of Home Rule, M. K. Thompson
concludes that Gladstone effectively strengthened his political security although it is also
arguable that risk was involved because, while he gained the Irish vote, Gladstone did
lose some Liberal members to Chamberlain’s group, and in turn, they would eventually
take the form of the Liberal Unionists.223 In fact, Thompson suggests that the issue of
Irish Home Rule redefined Liberalism, creating contention between Gladstonian loyalists
and Liberal secessionists who sided with the Conservatives on the matter.224 However,
Gladstone’s maneuver to increase his representation of Ireland succeeded and his
consideration of adopting Irish Home Rule allowed him the advantage over the
Conservatives during and after the 1885 election.225 Cunningham further indicates that
Gladstone began viewing Ireland as a “distinct nation,” and although he did not promote
an Ireland that was independent from the Empire, he exceeded the caution of
Chamberlain’s position regarding the Irish by seeking to bestow greater responsibilities
of governance to the nation.226 In this case, Gladstone’s adoption of the Home Rule cause
brought him into uncharted territory because the possibility remained that siding with
Ireland’s cause could jeopardize his standing as the Liberal leader. However, Gladstone
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openly supported the endeavor toward greater Irish representation in the spirit of his
progressive tendencies, in spite of unknown outcomes.
In 1885, before his third premiership, Gladstone merged his newfound focus on
Home Rule with the ambitions of Parnell and the Irish Nationalists. According to St.
John, Gladstone and Parnell possessed a significant common parameter regarding Home
Rule. Both insisted that while Ireland should form a national government to deal with
immediate domestic affairs, the nation should remain loyal to the British Empire.227 In
other words, the initial approach to Home Rule support would not imply independence
from Britain but did allow Ireland to control a greater measure of its own affairs,
including gaining a stronger voice in the British government. Meanwhile, the present
state of devolution did not allow for Irish politicians to exert an active voice in
parliamentary proceedings. Gladstone viewed devolution as beneficial to British
Parliament because it meant that he could represent Irish interests by allowing them selfgovernance while simultaneously “cleansing” the House of Commons from an unstable
element of the Irish Nationalists.228 These proposals over the direction of Ireland’s future
prompted Gladstone to propose a bill in 1886 supporting the “devolution to an Irish
Parliament,” isolating the responsibilities of international policy and defense to British
authority while leaving all other questions to be answered by Ireland’s governance.229
The bill went through two readings with Chamberlain protesting against its passage on
both readings and Lord Hartington joined the challenge on the second. Each MP
countered Gladstone by charging that his bill proposed an experimental government that
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would undermine British sovereignty.230 Pugh adds that Hartington and Chamberlain
contributed to the bill’s defeat by persuading a considerable number of MPs toward the
Liberal Unionist faction, further splitting the party and guaranteeing failure at
Gladstone’s first attempt at obtaining Home Rule for Ireland.231 On examination of the
bill’s potential effects, Gladstone apparently sought to appease both Irish and English
sympathies by creating a compromised approach to Home Rule. The compromise
required all to bend their expectations for the sake of consensus. Unfortunately for
Gladstone, the Conservatives, the Liberal Unionists, and the Irish Nationalists each
possessed specific objectives that did not concede a middle-ground solution, thereby
insuring incompatibility and defeat. Despite this setback, Gladstone continued to pursue
the representative aspect of Home Rule connecting the movement to his Gladstonian
sensibilities and adapting his notions to further focus on Irish needs.
The proposal of the first Home Rule bill did not gain majority support for passage
through Parliament; however, public opinion on the matter recognized Gladstone as
someone concerned with the Irish plight. One key feature of the bill challenged the
relationship between Ireland and Britain as dictated by the Act of Union, and although it
did not address every complaint that emerged from the people’s concerns, the Irish likely
understood that Gladstone was looking to alter aspects of the imperial status quo.232 On
one end of the Irish representation spectrum, the people praised Gladstone’s endeavors in
Parliament, stressing the importance of gaining a greater voice in the British government
and even acknowledging a possible answer to the previous strife caused by the Act of
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Union.233 On the other side, facets of the Irish media predicted the inevitability that the
bill would not pass through Parliament without modifications favoring the institution of
British sovereignty.234 Public outlets also expressed further doubts as to the validity of the
bill concerning constitutionalism which seemingly forbade Irish Home Rule but conceded
that continued coercion would be a worse alternative. Gladstone himself referenced this
last impediment to passage. In The Evening Telegraph, Gladstone is referenced in his
perspective regarding the two choices between Home Rule or coercion:
Whenever we have failed to govern Ireland successfully we have blindly resorted to
coercion. What is the alternative from the measure now proposed? If the Bill for the
future, and we may now add the better, government for Ireland is defeated we must
perforce go back to the old and, alas, unsuccessful panacea of coercion.235
These various opinions prove that Home Rule was a considerably difficult issue and if
passed it would transform the domestic face of Empire, forcing Britain to recognize the
Irish as relevant partners rather than mere subjects to the English crown. Although the
first Home Rule bill failed, its proposal moved Britain into a transition period in which
Parliament had to consider the possibility of a separate Irish government capable of a
limited degree of self-rule. Many Irish citizens demonstrated the propensity to view
Gladstone as a champion of their cause of greater representation. Gladstone contributed
to this significant transformation of British policy, thereby adding revolutionary traits to
his attributed Liberalism.
Despite the setbacks that prevented his first Home Rule bill from passing through
Parliament, Gladstone continued his efforts to represent Ireland during his fourth and
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final premiership.236 Interestingly, and perhaps more significant to his fourth premiership
than to his former dealings with Ireland, Gladstone openly risked powerful opposition by
insisting upon radical changes to the 1886 bill. Gladstone fervently defended the validity
of the bill in the face of resistance because it represented Irish needs more distinctly than
what Parliament had previously been willing to concede.237 In 1893 Gladstone drafted the
second Home Rule bill with new parameters allowing for a bicameral legislature elected
by constituents and promoting the election of an executive leader, regardless of his
denominational belief or party affiliation.238 This facet of the second bill demonstrated
greater propensity for democratic alteration than his previous solution for Home Rule.
However, the most significant addition to the 1893 bill was that Gladstone now supported
the inclusion of Irish MPs to the House of Commons, although they could not vote on
British matters.239 Gladstone’s new measures for Home Rule passed in the House of
Commons, but ultimately faltered in the House of Lords, ensuring the bill’s downfall and
preventing Gladstone from accomplishing Home Rule for Ireland by the end of the
nineteenth century.240 Undoubtedly, Gladstone’s Home Rule endeavors did not succeed
in a direct sense nor did Gladstone bring unchecked democratic reform to the Irish
people. However, this final bill by Gladstone confirms that a significant portion of his
leadership career was dedicated to Ireland’s concerns and its representation. The
measures he championed did create the framework for future attempts and for final
passage of Home Rule legislation.
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The finality of Gladstone’s fourth appointment to the office of prime minister
suggests that his last political ambitions largely targeted Ireland, thereby reflecting his
long-term goal to answer the Irish Question. MP Justin McCarthy states that Gladstone’s
primary reason for seeking a final office term was to complete his work with Ireland,
indicating a quality of genuine enthusiasm by Gladstone to represent that nation’s
interests to the end of his career.241 In fairness, McCarthy’s position, that Gladstone’s
intentions were strictly noble, is unsurprising as he was counted among a number of
liberal based Irish Nationalists loyal to the Gladstonian cause.242 Ireland’s people seemed
divided over Gladstone’s motivations, but similar to McCarthy’s perspective they
acknowledged that the Liberal prime minister’s efforts could not be ignored. His
contribution, while controversial, certainly shook the existing state of affairs between
England and Ireland. English opinion also varied with some newspapers such as the Star
and the Echo praising Gladstone’s efforts to represent Ireland in Parliament and other
media including the Evening News and the Westminster Gazette, expressing doubts of
any benefits that the second Home Rule bill would bring to Britain.243 In either case, the
bill’s testament to Gladstonian policy was not determined by whether Gladstone had
succeeded in passing a revolutionary Home Rule act or whether he had failed to win over
Parliament. Rather, the continuous endeavor by Gladstone to represent an oppressed
people, despite the risk to his own career and the likelihood that British Parliament would
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not accept Irish Home Rule, validated a constant attribute of democratic progressiveness
inherent to his method of governance.
The Irish Question provided a decisive pursuit for Gladstonian policy because,
from the point of his initial methods of pacification for the country within his first
premiership to his avid support for Ireland’s right to self-rule during his final days in
office, Gladstone remained fixed to a position of representative administration for the
Irish people. When first becoming Prime Minister, Gladstone hoped to conciliate Ireland
through church disestablishment, land resolutions, and education revisions. Largely
unsuccessful in appeasing Irish nationalists, Gladstone reconstituted his measures to meet
Irish demands, resorting to increased coercion but pursuing progressive treatment for
tenants, thereby indicating a recognition by Gladstone that Ireland needed greater
delegation in Parliament for its struggles. Although short-lived, Gladstone’s third
administration amounted to the most significant shift in his career. Unlike his previous
notions of viable Irish representation, Gladstone’s loyalty shifted further in favor of Irish
desires to form their own government even going so far as to ally with the nationalist
Parnell, both compromising for Ireland’s benefit. Gladstone had not fully embraced the
concept of Home Rule. However, he challenged the established relationship between
Britain and Ireland dating back to the 1800 Act of Union. In the closing years of his
career, Gladstone yet again strived for Irish Home Rule and conceded the need to adhere
to an Irish government concerning Irish interests. Despite setbacks and failures over
several of his political enterprises relating to Ireland’s plight, Gladstone tirelessly aspired
to solve the Irish Question throughout the entirety of his parliamentary administration.
The culmination of his achievements in Ireland’s representation and Home Rule,
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although limited, marked a defining theme of progression towards an independent Irish
state and consequently, a democratically conscious British government.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This thesis has aimed to highlight the unique representative qualities of
Gladstone’s political practices by discussing various accomplishments throughout his
career both before and during his four premierships. As a group those political
achievements vary within the political spectrum in a way that allows for them to be
defined as Gladstonian Liberalism. Gladstone’s considerations for disestablishment of
both the Irish and Scottish Churches were initially featured to convey a significant
decision that partially defined his first premiership. Despite Gladstone’s devotion to the
Anglican Church, he, through both a practicality aimed at political shrewdness and a
sincerity for extended religious freedoms, promoted the disestablishment of the Church of
Ireland. By doing so, Gladstone decreased to some measure the authoritative hold that
England had placed over the Irish since the 1800 Act of Union. Although Gladstone
never achieved the same solution, concerning disestablishment, for Scotland, the situation
was different due to the overwhelming Catholic dissention in Ireland, allowing Gladstone
to address the needs of both nations while garnering favor from various interested parties.
In retrospect, Gladstone’s objectives in disestablishment distanced Britain further from
strict imperial sovereignty. Gladstone moved the British Empire closer toward an
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identifiably United Kingdom conscientious of its population’s underrepresented
communities that set a foundation for reforms in the twentieth century.
The second chapter conveys a broader look at Gladstone’s achievements
throughout the entirety of his career and describes key components of his international
policies. In the onset of the Crimean War, Gladstone’s budget policies allowed for
successful war funding. More to the point, Gladstone essentially placed the fiscal
responsibility of war into the hands of Britain’s citizens, thus bestowing the power of
international conflict on them rather than solely on the government. In the midst of
Ottoman aggression toward Bulgarians, Gladstone proved that his adherence to
representation did not halt within the bounds of Britain as he maintained a strong front as
Leader of the Opposition to the Conservatives and he extended a political voice in favor
of protecting Bulgarian Christians abroad. Effectively, Gladstonian policy bridged liberal
sentiments and compassions to a forceful international presence. After his dealings with
the Ottomans and after contemplating practical traits connected with a Conservative
approach to imperial trade interests, Gladstone met with his own controversial incident
against Mahdist forces in Sudan. Of the various agendas linked with Gladstonian
Liberalism the death of Gordon at Khartoum reveals flaws within Gladstone’s
governance, but also confirms a constant desire to maintain imperial interests so long as
they represented what he believed to be in Britain’s best interests. In other words, while
failing to meet the immediate desires of the people, Gladstone looked toward future
possibilities in hopes that diminishing a military presence in Sudan would also prevent
further aggression against Britain, thereby promoting pragmatism in place of imperialism.
These three global policies by Gladstone all indicate a likelihood that the people of

104

Britain, and by extension various groups within the international community as is the
case with Bulgaria, garnered his personal interest and added to the scope of Gladstonian
Liberalism. He extended his progressive sentiments beyond the borders of Britain and on
occasion Gladstone did so regardless of the potential impairment to his favor on the home
front.
When discussing the various elements of democratic legislation in Gladstonian
Liberalism, the issue of social representation must be included. The third chapter also
bestows a broad perspective of Gladstone’s achievements, although the major
considerations in this case targeted his domestic obligations which were largely
successful in promoting his progressive tendencies. The obvious reflections of
Gladstone’s leadership qualities appear in his representation of the working class in
Britain. This is true regarding his budget reforms aimed at easing the economic burdens
of the working class. However, the identifiable democratic traits of Gladstone’s
administration manifested when he pursued broader enfranchisement to the working class
and when he relinquished his own desires regarding honorable voting in political favor of
the secret ballot. In these acts Gladstone yet again demonstrated that his priority, while
laced with bureaucratic practicality, adhered to the voice of the British people, thereby
signaling another attribute linked with the democratic process backed by governmental
legislation.
Finally, of the numerous pursuits and achievements included in Gladstone’s
premierships, his continuous yet adaptive pursuit of a solution for the Irish Question
reflected some of the most significant attributes of Gladstonian Liberalism and its
adherence to progressive democratic elements. Initially his approach lacked the
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recognition of Ireland as a distinct nation capable of its own governance although he still
committed to various reforms to meet Irish needs. By his third premiership, if not sooner,
Gladstone recognized a fundamental truth that if Britain hoped to maintain a semblance
of peace and unity with Ireland, Parliament would need to adopt a cooperative stance by
allowing Irish constituents a plausible degree of control over their own legislation.
Despite an initial setback with his first Home Rule bill, Gladstone proposed another act
with the potential for more leniency toward Irish rights by allowing them a greater voice
within the British Parliament and thereby he hoped to extend limited political authority to
Irish MPs Since Gladstone endured to find a viable solution to the Irish question until the
finality of his political career, Irish Home Rule feasibly retains a place as the most
recognizable representation of his relentless determination to gradually introduce
democratically progressive opportunities to underrepresented societal groups throughout
Britain.
In conclusion, Gladstonian Liberalism demonstrated both an evolving sense of
social representation and a personal adoption of finite democratic traits through the
malleability of Gladstone’s political policies as a British MP. The application of
democracy was never targeted toward a complete transition of power to the British
citizenry, but rather to broaden the voice of the people so that Parliament could address
the varying needs of a vast and complex Empire. Furthermore, Gladstone’s objectives did
not pertain solely to England alone, but he did include various subjects of the British
Empire while still maintaining particular attentiveness to nations situated within the
United Kingdom. Respectively, this method of Gladstonian administration emerged from
a hybrid of sociopolitical governance combining personal moral principles, selective
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Conservative values, and versatile Liberal qualities. These measures along with the
manifestation of a gradual transition toward a more democratic United Kingdom allowed
Gladstone to garner a place among Britain’s most influential leaders through his unique
and adaptable legislation. It produced an effect that is recognizably Gladstonian
Liberalism, which changed the Victorian Era politically, and which precluded democratic
and decolonization reforms of the twentieth century.
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In order to prove Gladstone’s devotion to Anglican principles, it is essential to read from
Gladstone’s own wording which, in the case, reflects his strong faith as a motivation for
several aspects of his political career.
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"The Two Budgets; Or Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Gladstone." Liverpool Mercury, April 22, 1853.
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"Why Should Mr. Gladstone Not Contest Midlothian?" The Evening Telegraph (Dundee),
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